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Introduction. 
"At one moment they would be battling fiercely for markets, cutting prices, trying to 
undersell one another; at the next, they would be courting one another, trying to make an 
arrangement to apportion the world's markets amongst themselves; at still the next, they 
would be exploring mergers and acquisitions. On many occasions they would be doing all 
three in an atmosphere of great suspicion and mistrust, no matter how great the cordiality at 
any given moment:" 
Yergin, "The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power." 
The regulation of competition within the European Community stands as one of the original 
and principal objectives of the Treaty of Rome 1957. Article 3 of the EC Treaty sets out the 
steps to be taken by the Community in order to achieve fulfilment of the two related aims of 
Article 2 EC: the establishment of a Common Market and an Economic and Monetary Union. 
To facilitate the creation of a Common Market, the Treaty requires under Article 3(g), the 
institution of "a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted". 
Regulation of competition is then fundamental to the creation of a single market. The close 
relationship between competition policy and the free movement of goods had been 
appreciated since the early years of the Community. In its Fifth General Report on the 
Activities of the EEC in 1971, the Commission emphasised the degree to which these two 
areas are related: 
"The creation and development of this unified market would be difficult i f not impossible i f 
while conventional trade barriers among the Six were being speedily reduced, other obstacles, 
less visible but equally restrictive were allowed to persist. These may arise from Member 
States applying different economic and fiscal regulations, or systems of state aid, or from the 
abuse of dominant positions on the part of private firms or from agreements to restrict 
competition among them." 
Competition policy is therefore fundamental to the objectives of the Community. It is often 
termed one of the "three pillars" of Community law; the free movement of goods and the free 
movement of workers forming the other two pillars. 
Provision for the implementation of Community competition policy was made in the original 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. Articles 85-90 contain the rules applying to private and public 
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undertakings. Article 85 prohibits forms of co-operation between firms that are anti-
competitive whilst Article 86 prohibits the abuse of market power by a single undertaking 
that dominates a market for goods or services. Under Article 89(1) EC the European 
Commission has a general duty "to ensure the application of the principles laid down in 
Articles 85 and 86". Under Article 87(1) EC the Council was required to adopt appropriate 
regulations and directives to give effect the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86. It did this 
in Regulation 17/62. This regulation sets out the powers available to the Commission and the 
procedures to be followed in the enforcement of competition policy. 
This study examines the method of enforcement of competition policy. As one of the 
principal elements in the system of Community law, the operation and control of competition 
policy enforcement mechanisms provided under the Treaty is of fundamental importance to 
the application of Community law. 
This examination of competition policy enforcement is set in the context of the application of 
general principles of Community law. The general principles as developed by the European 
Court of Justice are scrutinised in their relationship and application to competition law 
enforcement procedures. Chapter One of this work studies the development of the body of 
law that forms the general principles of Community law with particular emphasis on the 
development of fundamental human rights as a Community general principle. Later chapters 
assess the application of those general principles to the enforcement procedures in Regulation 
17/62. Chapter Two analyses the right to be heard in competition law proceedings and the 
extent to which this right is granted under the general provisions of the Treaty and under 
Regulation 17/62. Chapter Three examines the position of the European Commission and the 
plurality of its roles in competition law proceedings. This involves scrutiny of the powers of 
the Commission at the various stages in the enforcement of competition cases, from 
investigation through to the issuing of a decision. 
Chapter Four analyses the investigative powers of the Commission. This involves a 
discussion of the powers of the Commission to conduct what has become known as a "dawn 
raid" upon the offices of undertakings suspected of infringing Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty. 
Chapter Five assesses the development of legal and professional privilege as a general 
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principle of Community law. This development is traced through competition law cases 
where undertakings have challenged the claims of the Commission to documents containing 
communications between the undertaking and its lawyer. The position of the in-house lawyer 
is also assessed. 
Finally in Chapter Six issues of confidentiality relating to professional and business secrets in 
competition law proceedings are addressed. Legislative provision in this field is scrutinised. 
The contribution of the Court of Justice in the protection of business secrets is also examined. 
Each Chapter of this work seeks to assess the current state of the law and offer a critique of its 
operation in the different areas examined. Proposals for reform, where they are considered 
necessary, are made in the body of each chapter. 
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Chapter One. 
General Principles of Community law. 
The purpose of this first chapter is to examine the development of general principles 
as a source of Community law. This wi l l provide a basis for the examination, in later 
chapters, of the relationship between these principles, and the powers of the EC 
Commission in the enforcement of competition policy under Regulation 17/62. 
This discussion wil l begin with an examination of the historical development of the 
concept of general principles through the case law of the European Court. The 
position and the impact of the European Convention of Human Rights as a source of 
general principles under Community law will then be examined. The chapter wi l l end 
with a critique of recent legal developments in the field of fundamental human rights 
within the Community. 
No legal system can provide in its constitution or body of legislation for all questions 
that may come before its courts. In the same way the legislation and Treaties of the 
Community, whilst providing a framework, or a traite cadre, has in no way provided a 
comprehensive system of law. It is probable that this was a deliberate policy on the 
part of those who drafted the original Treaties. The reasons for this are twofold. 
Firstly, and from a purely practical point of view, it would have been difficult to 
provide more than a framework system due to the complexity and sensitivity of the 
task in hand and the number of Member States involved. Secondly, a framework alone 
was provided in order to develop a dynamic and evolving system of law which would 
be responsive to the Community as it matured. This framework, coupled with the 
judicial activism of the Court has provided the basis for the formulation of 
Community general principles. 
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1.1 Sources of General Principles 
Ken Leanaerts1 views the catalogue of Community rights having as their nucleus the 
fundamental rights as contained in the European Convention of Human Rights and its 
present and future protocols. The next circle is made up of general principles of law 
that are incorporated into the body of Community law by virtue of Article 164 of the 
Treaty of Rome. This states "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed". This would appear 
to refer to a higher law to be applied in the interpretation of Community law. It is 
from this Article that principles of law that exist in some member states have been 
deemed to be Community general principles. 
The third circle of Community fundamental rights are, according to Leanaerts, made 
up of the rights specifically related to the status of citizen of the Community. Finally 
the outer circle of rights are those which can be termed "aspirational" fundamental 
rights. These include social and economic rights, cultural and educational rights and 
consumer rights. 
In this examination of Community general principles the first two sources of rights, 
those included in ECHR, and those provided under "the law" as referred to in Article 
164 and other Treaty provisions wil l be examined. The rights included in Leanearts 
third and outer circle all have these two provisions as their source. 
1.2 General Principles Adopted under Treaty Provisions and the Laws of the 
Member States 
In addition to Article 164 of the Treaty, Article 173 provides more specific provision 
for the development of general principles. It lays down the grounds on which a 
Community act may be annulled by the Court. One of these grounds is 
"infringement of this Treaty, or of any rule of law relating to its application". 
1 "Fundamental Rights to be included in a Community Catalogue" (1991) 16 E L Rev. 367 
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As with Article 164 this again appears to refer to some body of law beyond the Treaty. 
This Article is of particular relevance to competition law as wi l l be illustrated in 
Chapter Two of this work. 
Article 215(2) EC deals with liability in tort and expressly provides that the liability 
of the Community is based on the "... general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States". This illustrates the willingness on the part of the Community 
founders to apply general principles even in the absence of specific Treaty provision. 
The crucial issue in any examination of the general principles of Community law is 
the method adopted in the development and application of these principles. To 
understand this method, the historical development of general principles by the Court 
of Justice must be examined. 
General principles of the member states are interpreted as forming part of the law of 
the Community i f they exist in some significant part amongst the member states. 
According to Leanearts,2 "General principles of Community law all share the 
characteristic of being based - in their very essence, not necessarily in their precise 
contours - on the common legal traditions of the member states". 
It is not essential that the principle be accepted by the legal systems of all the member 
states but that it "...conforms to a trend within the majority of the member states".3 
In Hoogovens v. High Authority,4 Advocate General Lagrange stated that the Court is 
not content to adopt the common denominator between different systems but 
"...chooses from each of the Member States those solutions which, having regard to 
the objects of the Treaty, appear to it to be the best...". 
Once adopted as a general principle, that principle becomes one of Community law 
and not national law. Thus Community law in Member states wi l l be interpreted in the 
context of the general principles. However this applies only to areas of law that fall 
within Community competency. 
2 "Fundamental Rights to be included in a Community Catalogue" (1991) 16 E L Rev. 367 
3 Hartley "Foundations of European Community Law" Third Edition p.138 
4 Case 14/61 [1962] E C R 253 at 283-84 
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The historical development of general principles in Community law can be best 
illustrated by identifying specific areas and their development. The areas identified in 
this work are those of relevance to the role of the Commission in the competition law 
enforcement process. These wil l be examined in Chapters Two to Five of this work. 
The role of the Court of Justice has of course been pivotal in the formulation of 
general principles. The Court has evolved these principles in a manner akin to the 
judicial development of the common law. "As in so many areas of European Law, the 
history of the evolution of Community human rights is at once a history of EC J 
activism."5 This development has not been without its problems. In the field of 
fundamental human rights as Community general principles, Member states have been 
particularly resistant to interference in what they perceive to be an area of exclusively 
national competence. This has been the case particularly with Germany and can be 
seen in the cases of Stauder6 and Internationale Handelsgesellschaff discussed 
below. 
The Court has not been shy of proclaiming their pivotal role in the formulation of 
general principles. Referring to the role of the Court in this field John Temple Lang 
has stated,8 "We are building what has not existed for fifteen hundred years, a 
common law of Europe". 
Perhaps the most influential general principle is that of fundamental human rights. 
This has been a relatively recent development in Community law. There is no human 
rights basis to the Treaty framework which was and remains essentially an economic 
treaty. According to Hartley: "...it is probably fair to say that the conversion of the 
European Court to a specific doctrine of human rights has been as much a matter of 
expediency as conviction"9. 
5 Ian Ward "A Critical Approach to European Law"pl38 Butterworths 1996 
6 Case 29/69 [1969] ECR419 
7 Case 11/71 [1970] E C R 1125 
8 "The Sphere in Which Member States are Obliged to Comply with the General Principles of Law and 
Community Fundamental Rights Principles" Legal Issues of European Integration 23 1991 
9 "Foundations of European Community Law" Third Edition p. 139 
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This issue of expediency is entwined with the concept supremacy of Community law. 
Supremacy has from the early days been strongly enforced by the Court.1 0 Most 
national courts came to accept this but some were faced with problems posed by their 
own constitutions. This was particularly the case for Germany. German lawyers 
questioned whether Community law could prevail over those provisions of the 
German constitution concerning human rights which were entrenched in their system 
after the second world war. There was no question of denying the supremacy of 
Community law over ordinary German law. However as German national legislation 
has to comply with the principles of the constitution, some German lawyers took the 
view that Community law could not apply in Germany i f it violated the fundamental 
human rights provisions of the constitution. This was the situation that prevailed in 
the 1960's. 
In the first case to discuss the conflict 1 1 the Court remained intransigent and declared 
Community law supreme over the national human rights provision. Germany 
remained adamant that it could not deviate from its pursuit of the protection of human 
rights within its constitution. Faced with this challenge to its supremacy, the Court 
took a conciliatory stance. In Stauder v. City ofUlm12 it declared the Community 
concept of human rights. The Court went onto state that it would annul any provision 
of Community law contrary to human rights. The facts of the case are not relevant 
here, but in dismissing the claimants case the Court stated:13" Interpreted in this way 
the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human 
rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the 
Courts". 
The principle was further developed in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.u This 
case concerned the principle of proportionality. Under German law this doctrine 
permits public authorities to impose on the citizen only those obligations that are 
1 0 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585 
1 1 Case 1/58 Stork v. High Commission [1959] ECR 17 
1 2 Case 29/69 [1969] ECR 419 
1 3 at para 10 
1 4 Case 11/71[1970] ECR 1125 
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necessary for attaining the public objective in question. The Community provision 
was challenged in the German courts and its validity was referred to the European 
Court. The European Court stated that its validity could only be judged according to 
Community law and not under national law. On this basis even i f the human rights 
provisions of a Member State are violated this would not invalidate the Community 
provision. This defiant stance was however softened by adding: 
"However, an examination should be made as to whether or not any analogous 
guarantee inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In fact, respect for 
fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by 
the Court of Justice."15 
The next development took place in Nold v. Commission.16 Here the Court considered 
the right to property and the free pursuit of an economic activity. The Court 
recognised these two rights as principles of Community law but held that they must 
not be regarded as absolute and unqualified but subject to the limitations of the overall 
objectives of the Community. In the course of its judgement the Court made the 
following statement: 
"In safeguarding these (fundamental) rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration 
from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore 
uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognised and 
protected by the constitutions of those States. 
Similarly, international Treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law." 
As with all general principles, there is no strict rule that national provisions on 
fundamental rights wi l l be incorporated into Community law. The Court is "inspired" 
by such provisions and the concepts underlying them, but does not see itself as bound 
by them. Some writers however are at odds with this view. 1 7 Schermers states that in 
1 5 The Court has since adopted the principle of proportionality as a general principle and it is invoked 
frequently. See as a UK example on a reference to the Court of Justice Case 181/84 R. v. Intervention 
Board for Agricultural Produce, ex parte Man (Sugar) [1985] ECR 2889 
1 6 Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491 
1 7 see Schermers "The E C Bound by Fundamental Human Rights" (1990) 27 CMLRev. 249 at 253-5. 
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most situations the Court wi l l consider itself bound by general principles as they exist 
in member states: 
"Where one member state considers a particular principle so important that it 
incorporates it in its Constitution, one may safely submit that principle forms part of 
the European cultural heritage. Even though other states may not give it any 
constitutional rank they wil l normally accept it, also as a principle of law. To be 
recognised as a principle of Community law the principle does not necessarily have to 
be incorporated into the written legal system of each member state." 
Hartley, in his discussion on this topic 18states that policy dictates the Court's 
approach. I f the right is accepted throughout the Community and the right does not 
prejudice fundamental Community aims, then the Court would probably accept it, 
even i f it was constitutionally accepted in only one Member State.19 
It appears that the Court has adopted a method of extracting from national laws rules 
of law which apply to the application of the Treaty. Rather than approaching this 
exercise in a arithmetical manner i.e. by examining i f a particular principle applies in 
the majority of member states and ruling it applicable, it selects which particular 
national rules when applied to the objectives of the Treaty appear the most effective in 
fulfilling the aims of the particular Community provision. A particularly good 
example of this can be seen in the development of the general principle of legal and 
professional privilege as discussed in Chapter 5. 
1.3 General Principles and the Role of European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms is the most influential treaty in terms of its impact on the formulation of 
Community general principles. A l l the Community member states are signatory to the 
Convention. As the Court of Justice developed an acceptance of fundamental rights as 
1 8 "Foundations of Community Law" at p. 144 
1 9 With the proviso that the right in question is uncontroversial eg. abortion in Grogan Case 159/90 
(1991) ECR 4685. This discussion is unfortunately outside the range of this work. 
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general principles of law which it had a duty to uphold, the impact of the European 
Convention, itself a major source of these rights, increased. The status of the 
European Convention as a source of fundamental rights under Community law has 
been analysed in a number of cases before the Court. 
In the ERT 20case, the Court was asked for a preliminary ruling on the effect of, inter 
alia Article 10 of the European Convention on Community law. The case was 
concerned with the legality of a national system of exclusive television rights. The 
Court declared: "The European Convention on Human Rights has special 
significance...It follows that the Community cannot accept measures which are 
incompatible with observance of the human rights thus recognised and guaranteed".21 
The Court went on to explain the status of the European Convention in Community 
law and in the domestic laws of the member states: 
"As the Court has held...it has no power to examine the compatibility with the 
European Convention on Human Rights of national rules which do not fall within the 
scope of Community.On the other hand, where such rules do fall within the scope of 
Community law, and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, it must 
provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine 
whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of 
which the Court ensures and which derive in particular from the European Convention 
on Human Rights."22 
The Court has on numerous occasions been called upon to examine the status of the 
European Convention in Community law disputes regarding competition law issues. 
Chapters Three and Four provide specific details of this. 
It is essential in any analysis of the European Convention and Community law to 
appreciate the constitutional relationship between them. This is an area of confusion 
in the minds of many - particularly the British media who class the two systems of 
law together as "Europe", failing to understand the fundamental differences and 
complex relationship between them. 
2 0 Case C-290/89 [1991]ECR 1-2925 
2 1 at para 41 
2 2 at para 42 
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The European Convention on Human Rights was drafted in 1950 under the auspices 
of the Council of Europe, an international organisation composed of twenty five 
Western European states. It was intended to uphold common political traditions of 
individual civil liberties and the rule of law. It was drafted in the aftermath of the 
second world war and was designed as a protection against the arbitrary use of 
political power which had resulted in the atrocities of the war time period. A l l of the 
member states of the European Communities are signatories to the European 
Convention together with the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. In many 
member states the convention has been directly incorporated into domestic law. As 
the UK has no written constitution, to form part of UK law the Convention would 
have to be incorporated into domestic law by Act of Parliament.23 This has not yet 
taken place. In strict legal terms therefore the Convention cannot be relied upon in the 
UK courts. In the case of Brind24 the applicant sought to rely upon the Convention to 
interpret domestic legislation. The House of Lords declined to do so stating that this 
would be "a judicial usurpation of the legislative function". 2 5 Despite the position 
taken by the House of Lords in Brind, in more and more cases, ranging from legal 
representation for prisoners26 to freedom of expression27 the provisions of Convention 
are being argued before UK courts and are being referred to by UK judges in their 
decisions. It remains the case however that the Convention is not a directly effective 
source of law in UK courts. This position is in direct contrast to that of Community 
law. By virtue of the European Communities Act 1972, Community law is 
incorporated into the domestic law of the UK and in the event of conflict, Community 
law prevails.28 
The European Court of Justice has, since its inception treated the Convention as a 
source law in formulating its general principles. It has done this on the basis that i f a 
2 3 this area of constitutional reform is currently being debated by the main political parties in the UK. 
2 4 Rv. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 All E R 720 
2 5 as per Lord Bridge 
2 6 eg. Rv. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Anderson [1984] QB 778 
2 7 eg. Attorney - General v. Guardian Newspapers (Nos 1 and 2/1987] 3 All ER 316 
2 8 on this point see the classic speech of Lord Denning in Bulmer Ltd. v. Bollinger SA /"1974] Ch. 401 
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member state is signatory to, or was involved in the development of an international 
treaty that forms part of that state's laws, this should be treated in the same way as 
general principles deriving from domestic law. 2 9 In a number of cases the Court has 
established that "any rule of law relating to the application of the Treaty" as provided 
by Article 173, includes the Convention by virtue of it forming part of the law of the 
member states.30 This means that under the general principles of Community law, 
Community acts are themselves void when they conflict with the Convention. This is 
an area of conflicting opinion between the Court and the member states. In Hauer3lthe 
Court emphasised that it was its preserve and it alone who would "exercise the 
balancing test" that determines at which point a human rights issue is a matter of 
Community or national concern. This conflicts with the ideas as expressed in the later 
ERP2 decision that member states retain automatic jurisdiction to consider human 
rights issues at a non-Community level. In both ERT and Klensch33 the Court 
appeared to backtrack from the position taken in Hauer. In Klensch it was keen to 
stress the limitations of its own jurisdiction to Community matters only. This raises 
the question of what exactly is a Community matter. This vexed question is of course 
the subject of ongoing political debate within the member states of the Community. 
The status of the Convention in Community law has been the subject of considerable 
debate in recent years within the Community institutions. The Parliament has adopted 
a number of resolutions on the topic of the Convention becoming integrated into 
Community law. The Commission has discussed the possibility of the Community 
acceding as i f it were a member state to the Convention. This would have the effect of 
subordinating the jurisdiction of the Court to that of the Court of Human Rights in 
respect of fundamental rights issues. 
2 9 for a detailed discussion of fundamental rights and international agreements see Hauer v. Rheinland-
Pflaz Case 44/79 [1979] E C R 3727 
3 0 see Kirk Case 63/83 [1984] E C R 2689 at 2585 and the Second AKZO Case 5/85 [1986] E C R at 2612 
3 1 Case 44/79 [1979] E C R 3727 
3 2 Case C-290/89 [1991]ECRI-2925 
3 3 Case 201-2/85 [1986] ECR 3477 
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In a Joint Declaration on Fundamental Rights in 1977,34 the three political 
Community institutions agreed to incorporate the Convention into its "soft law" 
measures ie.recommendations, opinions, conclusions and declarations. In its 
Declaration on Democracy made in Copenhagen in 1978, the Heads of Government of 
the Member States indicated approval of the Joint Declaration of the previous year 
and declared "that respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and 
human rights are essential elements of membership of the European Communities." 
This pattern of increased reference to the Convention continued with the Single 
European Act in 1986. The preamble to that Act refers to the fundamental rights 
recognised in inter alia the constitutions and laws of the Member states and the 
European Convention. 
In the Treaty of European Union in 1993 a stronger commitment to the Convention 
was undertaken. 
Article F(2) EC as amended by the TEU provides that 
" The Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the traditions common to the 
Member States." 
The constitutional impact of this provision is problematic. Article F(2) is contained in 
Title I of the TEU which does not form part of the EC Treaty and is therefore not 
directly applicable law. Further, Article L of the TEU expressly excludes Article F(2) 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. There is therefore no mechanism 
available under the Treaties to enforce the commitment made in Article F(2). The 
Article does little more than reflect the increasing awareness at the political level of 
the need for the Union to respect fundamental rights. 
Article F(2) does however give formal recognition in the Treaty (albeit only in the 
TEU and not incorporated into the EC Treaty) to what has in fact been part of the 
3 4 OJ 1977 C103/1 
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jurisprudence of the Court since Stauder. Therefore as the Court held in Wachauf v. 
Germany,3,5 the Community cannot accept measures that are incompatible with the 
observance of human rights. This effectively means that when there is a conflict 
between a national law that is intended to implement Community law (for example to 
fulf i l the terms of a directive) and the terms of the Convention, the Court wi l l rule the 
national measure as contrary to Community law. On the same basis i f an act of a 
Community institution is challenged as being in breach of the Convention, then the 
Court must rule the measure invalid. Of course the application of the Convention is 
limited to matters that fall within the Community's competency. The Court defined 
the limits of its powers in Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund36 stating that it (the 
Court) had no power to examine "the compatibility with the European Convention on 
Human Rights of national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law". 
According to Professor Arnull 3 7 the unofficial observance by the European Court of 
the Convention has created a weakness in the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
as laid down in the Convention. 
"However, the transfer of competence involved in acceding to the Community 
resulted in a corresponding diminution in the jurisdiction of the organs of the 
Convention, in the sense that matters which would previously have been dealt with at 
the national level were now to be dealt with by the institutions of an entity which was 
not subject to the control mechanisms established by the Convention." 
This would appear to conflict with the frequently proclaimed commitment of the 
Community to respecting fundamental rights. As a result of this the question of the 
Community itself acceding to the European Convention was raised in 1979. Such 
accession would result in the Community institutions being subject to the same review 
mechanisms as member states under the Convention. The 1979 memorandum38 
published by the Commission with the intention of encouraging debate on the issue 
3 5 Case 5/88 [1989] ECR 2609 
3 6 Case 12/86 [1987] E C R 3719 
3 7 "Opinion 2/94 and its implications for the future constitution of the Union" University of Cambridge 
Centre for European Legal Studies Occasional Paper No. 1 
3 8 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79 
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failed to find favour with the Council and no action was taken. In 1990, after the 
Single European Act in which express reference was made to the Convention, the 
Commission asked the Council for authority to negotiate the details of the accession 
of the Community to the Convention. According to the Commission "...no matter how 
closely the Luxembourg Court monitors human rights, it is not the same as scrutiny by 
the Strasbourg Court, which is outside the Community legal system and to which the 
constitutional courts and supreme courts of the member states are subject". 
The view of the Commission was that accession to the Convention would effect the 
legal systems of member states only in relation to the scope of a Community legal act. 
It would not create any new obligations on the member states beyond those already 
falling within the competency of the Community. The accession would they believed, 
provide the citizens of the member states with better protection against Community 
measures that might infringe their fundamental rights. 
As a result of the request from the Commission, the Council asked the Court of 
Justice for an Opinion whether accession by the Community to the Convention would 
be compatible with the EC Treaty. 
The Court responded to this in Opinion 2/94 28th March 1996. In it the Court 
concluded that the Community did not have the competency to accede to the 
Convention without amendment to the EC Treaty. The powers conferred under Article 
23 5 3 9 of the Treaty did not provide competency for the Community to accede to the 
3 9 which states "If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not 
provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures." 
The member states were not unanimous in their support of the proposed accession. Whether this was a 
factor in the formulation of the Court's Opinion is doubtful. Professor Schermers in his comments and 
conclusions in the C E L S Occasional Paper suggests that the Court's conclusion may have been 
different had all the member states supported the proposal. Professor Dashwood in the same forum 
doubted this. In his opinion "The Treaties in all their detail, represent a bargain that was democratically 
assented to, according to the different constitutional requirements of the Member States, when they 
joined the Community (or Union). Changes to that bargain ought not simply to be agreed by the 
representatives of Governments". It is submitted that such a view is an accurate analysis of the law in 
that the dramatic change to the structure of the Community should be debated in a wider forum before 
the proper course, that of Treaty amendment could be implemented. Such a course of action is also 
politically expedient in a climate of scepticism within some member states of the ever increasing 
powers of the Community. 
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Convention. It declared that as already established through the case law of the Court 
respect for human rights is a condition of the lawfulness of Community acts. 
"Accession to the Convention would, however, entail a substantial change in the 
present Community system for the protection of human rights in that it would entail 
the entry of the Community into a distinct international institutional system as well as 
integration of all the provisions of the Convention into the Community legal order."40 
Consequently the Court stated that such fundamental changes to the nature of the 
Community would "...be of constitutional significance and would therefore be such as 
to go beyond the scope of Article 235. It could be brought about only by way of 
Treaty amendment."41 
For the purposes of this work the Opinion of the Court is important. One vital issue is 
the potential problem of the Court of Human Rights adopting a view of the scope of 
the Convention that differs from that taken by the European Court. It is submitted that 
this has rarely occurred42 and that in cases where this has been the case any 
4 0 Opinion 2/94 of March 28,1996 para 34 
4 1 at para 35 
4 2 One particular example of differing interpretations of the provisions of ECHR by the Court of 
Human Rights can be seen in relation to Article 6(1) of the Convention and the right to be protected 
from giving self incriminating information. 
In Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283 the Court denied that any express right to 
remain silent exists under Regulation 17/62. The Court did however examine whether the right to 
silence forms part of the general principles of Community law of which fundamental rights are an 
integral part. In examining the laws of the Member States the Court found that the right not to give 
evidence against oneself applies only to a natural person charged with a criminal offence. According to 
the Court: 
" A comparative analysis of national law does not therefore indicate the existence of such a principle, 
common to the laws of the Member States, which may be relied upon by legal persons in relation to 
infringements in the ecomnomic sphere, in particular infringements of competition law." ( at p. 3350) 
The Court went on to consider whether Article 6(1) ECHR provided protection against self 
incrimination to an undertaking in competition law proceedings. 
Article 6(1) ECHR provides: 
" In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair trial and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public 
may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security 
in a democratic society, where the intersets of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice." 
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discrepancy between the two is marginal. Professor Arnul l 4 3 believes that where 
proceedings can be brought before the Court of Justice the level of protection for 
fundamental rights afforded to the parties is adequate. This has been the experience of 
litigants before the Court of Justice in competition law issues where the influence of 
the Convention has been very strong in the development of fundamental rights. 
So for those who have locus standi to bring a case before the Court of Justice 
fundamental rights are guaranteed and within the area of Community competence wil l 
apply the fundamental rights developed by the Court and inspired by the Convention. 
However the Opinion does not resolve the absence of recourse to law for individuals 
Article 6 is considered further in Chapter Three of this work in relation to the role of the Commission 
and its conformity to "an independent and impartial tribunal established by law". 
In Orkem the Court concluded that no protection against self mcrirnination was provided by Article 6. 
It held: 
" As far as Article 6 of the European Convention is concerned, although it may be relied upon by an 
undertaking subject to an investigation relating to competition law, it must be observed that neither the 
wording of that article nor the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights indicate that it 
upholds the right not to give evidence against oneself." 
This view is now at odds with the more recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
case of Funke v France, Judgement of 25 Feb. 1993 (No.256A), 16 E.C.H.R.R. 297. In this case Funke 
submitted to the European Court that his conviction for refusing to disclose documents requested by 
the French customs authorities risked his right to a fair trial as secured in Article 6(1) ECHR as the 
request violated the right not to give evidence against oneself. The European Court agreed stating that: 
" The special features of customs law... cannot justify such an infringement of the right of anyone 
"charged with a criminal offence" within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Article 6, to 
remain silent and not to contribute to mcriminating oneself." 
The European Court of Human Rights has therefore declared the existence of protection from self 
mcrimination under Article 6(1) and has applied this right to an economic infringement. A conflict 
now exists between the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights in Funke and the Court 
in Orkem. 
In Orkem, the Court, having stated that Article 6(1) did not provide protection against self 
mcrimination or a right to remain silent, went on to hold that the rights of the defence that form a 
fundamental principle of the Community legal order, prevented the Commission from compelling an 
undertaking "to provide it with answers that might involve an admission on its part of the existence of 
an infringement [of the Treaty competition rules] which it is incumbent upon the Commission to 
prove". 
According to Professor Arnull, (see footnote 43) any discrepancy between the two courts as to the 
interpretation of Article 6(1) will be small. He states " There may admittedly be room for argument 
over whether the rights of the defence under E C law have precisely the same scope as the right not to 
mcrrminate oneself under Article 6 of the Convention, but any discrepancy is likely to be marginal". 
Whilst this may be the case in practical terms, such a position does not resolve the underlying conflict 
between the two systems of law. If different approaches are adopted by the two courts over the 
interpretation of the Convention in factually similar cases, individual Member States and litigants will 
inevitably adopt different interpretations of these provisions. This lack of certainty and consistency 
adds still more weight to the evidence in favour of the accession of the Community to the Convention. 
4 3 CELS Occasional Paper N.l 
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who do not satisfy the strict rules laid down in Article 173 and who claims that his or 
her fundamental rights have been infringed by a Community institution. This issue is 
of importance in competition proceedings as it concerns the fundamental right to be 
heard as discussed in Chapter Two. Professors Arnull,Schermers and Dashwood44 all 
propose easing the conditions for the admissibility of actions brought by individuals 
under Article 173(4). Professor Arnull suggests an alternative to this in the creation of 
a new specific remedy giving individuals direct access to the Court where they 
consider their human rights have been violated by a Community institution or by 
national authorities acting under powers derived from the Treaty. It is submitted that 
this proposal would have to be strictly interpreted to prevent the abuse of such a 
procedure. Some restrictions as to locus standi must operate in any system to regulate 
and filter access to the courts. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Despite the confidence of Professors Arnull, Schermers and Dashwood the Opinion of 
the Court does not lay to rest the issue of the status of fundamental rights in 
Community law. There remain two main areas of concern. The first is that of the 
inconsistency of application of the Convention in member states and the second 
relates to the conflict in the underlying rationale of the Convention and the Treaty of 
Rome. 
On the first issue the amendments proposed by the above Professors are "stop-gap" 
measures and fail to address the wider question of the status of fundamental rights 
under the Convention and their relationship with the Community member states and 
the Community itself. The Community cannot develop a universally founded human 
rights jurisprudence because, as national law remains supreme in certain areas, 
application of the Convention is not universal. The citizens of those member states 
who have incorporated the Convention into their constitutions wil l remain better 
4 4 C E L S Occasional Paper No.l 
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protected than those who have not, the United Kingdom for example. The recent 
discussion by the Court of Appeal in Brind demonstrates how opposed the UK is to 
any suspicion of incorporation "through the back door".45 In M& Co v Germany46 the 
applicant brought their human rights case about an alleged Community violation not 
against the Community (as they were not confident of the status of the Convention 
under Community law), but against the German government, on the basis that the 
German authorities executed a Community act in breach of their human rights 
obligations under the Convention. The Human Rights Commission held inter alia that 
member states of the Convention remain responsible for alleged violation of the 
Convention regardless of whether the act in question is in consequence of obligations 
to international bodies. Otherwise according to the Human Rights Commission "...the 
guarantees of the Convention could wantonly be limited or excluded and thus be 
deprived of their peremptory character". However the Commission went on to state 
that i f the transfer of power was to a body who observed fundamental rights and 
accorded them equivalent protection to the Convention, then this would not be 
incompatible with the Convention. "The Commission notes that the legal system of 
the European Communities not only secures fundamental rights but also provides for 
control of their observance." 
The Human Rights Commission was not unanimous in this decision. According to 
Professor Schermers,47 the decision can be explained to a large extent by the 
expectation on the part of the Human Rights Commission that the Community would 
ultimately accede to the Convention and did not wish to interfere in the Community 
system at that stage. According to Schemers, now that the Community Court has 
blocked accession to the Convention the next case brought before the Human Rights 
Commission on similar grounds may well be decided differently. I f this were the case, 
the status of the Convention in each of the Community member states would become 
4 5 at the time of writing both the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have committed themselves to a 
review of the UK constitution which would involve incorporation of the Convention . 
4 6 App.no. 13258/87 M& Co v Germany 
4 7 Comments and Conclusions on Opinion 2/94, C E L S Occasional Paper No. lp. 16 
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pivotal providing an indirect remedy against the Community. This would result in 
inconsistencies of application amongst the member states. 
The second area of concern that the Opinion 2/94 leaves unresolved relates to the 
conflict in the rationales of the Community and the Convention. There wil l ultimately 
be inconsistencies between the two as the rights laid down in the Convention are 
fundamental human rights. Those which apply in Community law are primarily 
economic rights and fundamental rights are subject to the economic goals of the 
Community. Indeed the economic goals of the Community could be interpreted as 
fundamental human rights in themselves. There is then a conflict between the 
economic goals of the Treaty and the promotion of fundamental human rights. Where 
such conflict occurs the economic rights of the Treaty take priority over the human 
rights. In Nold4S the Court stated that a balance must be made between the substance 
of fundamental human rights and "certain limits justified by the overall objectives 
pursued by the Community". In Wachauf9 the Court, whilst confirming its 
commitment to fundamental human rights, was careful to emphasise that any 
fundamental rights were not absolute and must be interpreted in the light of wider 
economic and social interests. This conflict in the rationales between the Convention 
and the EC Treaty persists. According to Van Di jk 5 0 , "Consequently, it seems to leave 
larger room for placing the objectives of the Community above the human rights 
objectives; a raison d'Etat approach which is alien to international human rights 
standards". 
Van Dijk proposes that the solution to this conflict would be the Treaty amendment 
required for the Community to accede to the Convention according to Opinion 2/94 
28th March 1996. This amendment could be one of the results of the Inter-
Governmental Conference concerning revision of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Union. Van Dijk is doubtful that consensus between member states on such 
4 8 Case 4/73 [1974] E C R 491 
4 9 Case 5/88 [1989] E C R 2609 
5 0 "Judicial Protection of Human Rights in the European Union" Exeter Paper in European Law No. 1 
p.8 
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an amendment would be reached. In the event of failure to reach a consensus on 
amendment he calls for "Co-ordination as a minimum option".51 This would involve 
formalising the existing practice of consultation between the two judicial bodies in 
periodical meetings where the two Courts would discuss issues of interpretation and to 
what extent the different contexts of the two organisations justify certain variations. 
According to Ward 5 2 "...the root of the problem lies in the absence of a charter, or 
catalogue, of fundamental rights against which the economic rights of the Community 
can be tested". This absence is, according to Ward, "an incubator for inconsistency" in 
the interpretation of fundamental human rights. 
Some authors accuse the Court of Justice of deliberately failing to guarantee 
fundamental rights within the Community. 
" it must be questioned whether the court has ever been motivated by a concern for 
any supposed lack of adequate protection of fundamental rights within the 
Community...the court has employed fundamental rights instrumentally, so as to 
accelerate the process of legal integration in the Community. It has not protected these 
fundamental rights for their own sake. It has not taken these rights seriously."53 
Fundamental human rights have been used selectively in areas of Community 
competence to promote legal integration and the economic objectives of the 
Community. This criticism is given greater force by the recent Court opinion rejecting 
the competency of the Community to accede to the Convention. 
The way forward in the protection of fundamental human rights in the Community is 
for the Treaty to be revised to permit accession to the Convention. This appears to be 
the only mechanism that would guarantee consistency of application of human rights 
protection. This would clearly establish that, while the two courts remain supreme in 
their respective areas of competence, the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg is empowered to give the final interpretation of Convention provisions. 
5 1 ibid at p. 10 
5 2 Ian Ward "A Critical Introduction to European Law" p28 
5 3 Coppel & O'Neill" The European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?" 12 Legal Studies 227 
pp227-228 
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This would also go some way to resolving the complex issue of the precise definition 
of those acts of the Member States that are subject to review by the Court of Human 
Rights for their compliance with human rights principles because they fall within the 
scope of Community law, and those acts of the member states which, although issues 
of Community law are also involved, are not subject to that review because they fall 
within the primary competence of the legislature of the member states. 
Ultimately, as with all Community developments any progress towards Treaty 
amendment to facilitate accession to the Convention wi l l depend upon the political 
wi l l of the member states. In the current political climate it appears that such a 
development is unlikely in the near future. Whilst this is the case, the individual 
citizen will be subject to different human rights laws depending on country of birth or 
residence and the particular rights issue involved. According to Clapham54 the 
emphasis must shift from the member state "actor" to the citizen "victim " in 
European Human Rights law: 
"The rhetoric of human rights should not be underestimated. Human rights talk 
permeates into every sphere of life and not only serves to focus people's demands but 
also has a certain educational force which in the end is the best way to ensure that 
human dignity is protected. The challenge of the Community is to build on its 
achievements so far." 
I f the vital importance of human rights is to be recognised in Community law the 
Treaty must be amended to facilitate accession to the European Convention of Human 
Rights by the Community. This would remove conflicts in the interpretation and 
application of the Convention between the member states and the Community and 
provide a uniform system of appeal to the Commission of Human Rights to all 
Community citizens on matters of Community competence. 
5 4 "A Human Rights Policy for the European Community" 10 Yearbook of European Law 309 p.366 
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Chapter Two 
The Right to be Heard and Competition Law. 
Al l of the general principles of law discussed in this work have been developed by the 
jurisprudence of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice through the procedure of 
judicial review. 
Judicial review of the decisions of the Commission in competition law is provided in Articles 
173 and 175 EC. It was through the procedure of judicial review under Article 173 EC that 
the general principle of the right to be heard was established. Judicial review is crucial to the 
principle of the right to be heard. Only i f parties have the right to challenge acts which 
adversely impact upon them and be heard in the Court, can the general principle of the right 
to be heard be claimed to be effective in Community law. 
It is therefore essential in any discussion of the right to be heard in competition proceedings 
to examine how judicial review operates in this area. 
Before this however, it is important to look at the general principle of the right to be heard in 
Community law and more particularly in competition law proceedings. 
Provision for interested parties to be heard is granted in competition proceedings in Article 19 
Regulation 17/621 and Article 1 Regulation 99/63.2 The former article states that the 
Commission shall give the undertakings concerned the opportunity to be heard in matters on 
which the Commission has objected. Regulation 99/63 deals with the hearing procedure and 
states that upon notification of the objections of the Commission to the undertaking, a time 
limit will be set within which the undertaking may inform the Commission of their view. 
1 Regulation No.17. First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.OJ Sp. Ed. 1962, 
No.204/62 p.87 
2 Regulation No. 99/63/EEC of the Commission of 25 July 1963 on the Hearings Provided for in Article 19(1) 
and (2) of Council Regulation No. 17.0J Sp. Ed.1963, No.2268/63,p.47 
24 
2.1 The General Principle 
The first case in which the right to be heard was discussed in competition proceedings was in 
the Transocean Marine Paint case.3 In this case the applicants were a group of manufacturers 
who had made an agreement concerning the composition of their products, trademarks, 
quality control and division of their sales territory. The Commission had granted exemption 
under Article 85 (3) EC. On application to renew the exemption, the Commission imposed 
new conditions. The applicants argued that they had not been given the opportunity to make 
objections to the amended conditions to the Commission and that therefore the decision of the 
Commission was invalid due to procedural defect. 
The applicants applied to the Court under Article 173 of the Treaty seeking annulment of the 
Commission's decision that was addressed to them. 
In the Court, Advocate General Warner proposed that the case should be decided on the basis 
of the principle in English law of audi alteram partem.4 He argued that the right to be heard 
was a general principle of Community law and was therefore binding on the Commission 
even in the absence of a specific legal provision. According to Advocate General Warner: 
"There is a rule embedded in the law of some of our countries that an administrative 
authority, before wielding a statutory power to the detriment of a particular person, must in 
general hear what that person has to say about that matter even i f the statute does not 
expressly require it." 
He reached this conclusion after a survey of the legal systems of the member states in which 
he pointed out the important role that the right to be heard plays in English law. He also 
explained that the principle exists in various forms in other member states. 
"In my opinion, it matters little whether the applicable rule is subsumed under the title "audi 
"alteram partem" or...under the concept of "droits de la defense". What is undoubted is that 
French administrative law does acknowledge the existence of those "principes generaux du 
droit" which I have mentioned." 
3 Case 17/74 [1974] E C R 1063. 
4 that is as a principle of natural justice no man should be condemned unheard. See Ridge v Baldwin [\ 964] A C 
40 
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This view was accepted by the Court who stated that there is a general principle of 
Community law that "...a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision taken 
by a public authority must be given the opportunity to make his point of view known". 
The Court deduced from this that breach of the rule of the right to be heard would be regarded 
as a breach of an essential requirement under Article 173 of the Treaty. As the disputed 
condition in the decision was severable, it was annulled and the rest of the decision was 
allowed whilst the Commission was given the opportunity to reach a fresh decision on the 
point after hearing the observations of the Association. 
Since the Transocean decision, the Court has developed a general doctrine of what it calls the 
"rights of the defence" that equates with the English principle of natural justice and the 
American concept of due process. 
In the subsequent decision of Mollet v. Commission 5 the Transocean formula was narrowed. 
In Mollet the Court stated that for the principle of the right to be heard to be enforced in 
circumstances where this was not provided under statute, the measure must be one that is 
liable "...gravely to prejudice the interests of the individual" rather than those interests that are 
"perceptibly affected" by a decision as formulated in Transocean. 
Having examined the general principle of the right to be heard, this chapter wi l l go on to 
examine the provision for judicial review in Community law and its relevance to competition 
policy and enforcement. It wi l l then proceed to discuss the application of the law to acts of 
the Commission. Thereafter the rules relating to locus standi wi l l be studied as these are of 
fundamental importance to the issue of third party rights and the right to be heard. Finally the 
procedural issue of access to file and its importance to the issue of the right to be heard wi l l 
be examined. 
5 Case 75/77 [1978] E C R 19 
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2.2 Judicial Review under the E C Treaty 
Article 173 of the EC Treaty provides for a system of judicial review of all the acts of the 
Council and Commission other than recommendations or opinions. The Court has developed 
and enlarged its competency to review "...all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever 
their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects".6 
Thereafter Article 173 provides unrestricted locus standi to the Member States, the Council 
and the Commission. Restricted locus standi is granted to natural or legal persons to 
challenge acts. They have standing to challenge decisions that are addressed to themselves. 
Applicants who wish to challenge a decision that is not addressed to them must establish 
direct and individual concern. 
The grounds for challenge cover lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application and 
finally, misuse of powers. 
There is a strict two month time limit that applies to commencement of proceedings before 
the Court when challenging an act under Article 173. 
2.3 Reviewable Acts 
Competition law cases have been prominent in the Court on the issue of which measures are 
reviewable. Decisions of the Commission in competition cases are unproblematic as they are 
covered by Article 173 which provides that all the acts of the Council and the Commission 
other than recommendations and opinions are reviewable. However certain procedural 
measures and acts that fall short of decisions have been held to be reviewable by the Court. 
As noted above, the ERTA decision7 extended the jurisdiction of the Court to review all 
measures adopted by the Council and Commission that are intended to have legal effects. 
6 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA Case) [1971] E C R 263. Note also that Article 173 was amended 
under the Treaty of European Union so that the Court can review the legality of acts "adopted jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council ...and of acts of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effects 
vis a vis third parties". 
7 Case 22/70 [1971] ECR 263 
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Thus the test becomes one of the effect of act in question, rather than the strict substance of 
the act itself. This method of interpretation is illustrated in Cimenteries v Commission* where 
the Court found a Commission Notice, notified by registered letter to be a reviewable act 
under Article 173. 
In the Cimenteries case the Societe Anonyme Cimenteries was one of a number of 
undertakings who had entered into an agreement called the "Noordwijks Cement Accord" 
that, inter alia, divided up the market for the supply of cement and clinker using quotas. The 
undertakings involved notified the Commission of the agreement in accordance with 
Regulation 17/62 and applied for exemption from Article 85(3). 
In response the Commission addressed a notice to the undertaking under Article 15(6) 
Regulation 17/62. This removes exemption from fines for breach of Article 85 granted by 
Article 15(5) Regulation 17/62 to notified agreements. This reflected the Commission's view 
that the agreement breached Article 85(1) and that no grounds for exemption were applicable 
under Article 85(3). The Commission sent the notice by registered letter. 
The undertakings concerned brought an action under Article 173 challenging the validity of 
the Commission's notice and letter. The rationale behind the challenge was as follows. It was 
unlikely that the Commission would change its view as to the legality of the agreement when 
taking its final decision under Regulation 17/62. The probable effect therefore of the notice 
withdrawing exemption from a fine would be to force the undertakings to terminate the 
agreement. According to the Court " the preliminary measure would thus have the effect of 
saving the Commission from having to give a final decision thanks to the efficacy of the mere 
threat of a fine".9 
The Court therefore concluded that the Commission's notice and registered letter constituted a 
reviewable measure that deprived the undertaking of 
"...the advantages of a legal situation which Article 15(5) attached to the notification of the 
agreement, and exposed them to grave financial risk. Thus the said measure affected the 
8 Cases 8-11/66 [1967] E C R 75 
9 ibid p. 93 
28 
interests of the undertakings by bringing about a distinct change in their legal position... It 
thus constitutes not a mere opinion but a decision."10 
In the later case of IBM v. Commission11 the Court decided that a letter sent by the 
Commission to an undertaking being investigated under Article 17/62, containing a statement 
of objections against the undertaking and requiring it to reply within a specified time, was not 
a reviewable act. It stated that in principle provisional measures designed to prepare the basis 
for a final decision are not reviewable. It distinguished IBM from the Cimenteries case as 
follows; 
"A statement of objections does not compel the undertaking concerned to alter or reconsider 
its marketing practices and it does not have the effect of depriving it of the protection hitherto 
available to it against the application of a fine, as is the case when the Commission informs 
an undertaking, pursuant to Article 15(6) of Regulation 17, of the results of the preliminary 
examination of an agreement which has been notified by the undertaking."12 
In Air France v. Commission 1 3 the spokesman for the Competition Commissioner announced 
that the Commission had declared that it had no jurisdiction under the Merger Regulation14 to 
examine the acquisition of one airline by another. The applicant, a private party sought 
annulment of the decision made in the statement of the spokesman. This would require the 
Court finding that the statement was in fact a decision as this would be the only way in which 
the private party could seek annulment. The Court of First Instance concluded that the "act" 
had a definitive nature and had been made public. Further it found that "any measure the legal 
effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by 
bringing about a distinct change in his legal position is an act or decision that may be the 
subject of an action under Article 173 for a declaration that it is void".15 
1 0 ibid p. 91 
1 1 Case 60/81 [ 1981 ] ECR 2639 
1 2 ibid p. 2654 
1 3 Case T-3/93 [1994] ECR 11-121 
1 4 Council Regulation 4064/89 OJ L395/1 (corrected and published in (1990) OJ L257/90) on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings. 
1 5 Case T-3/93 [1994] E C R II 149 
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The finding by the Court that an act can be classified as a decision is crucial to the natural or 
legal person who is seeking annulment of that act. Without it there is no case and the act 
would not be open to challenge by bodies other than privileged applicants. Consequently 
Professor Greaves16 finds that where a challenge is made against a quasi-judicial 
administrative act, (as is often the case with the Commission in competition investigations) 
the Court is less concerned with questions as to the substance of the act concerned, than with 
the legal effects of the act on the person challenging it. 
2.4 Locus Standi and Non Privileged Applicants. Third Party Rights 
It appears therefore that the Court has been generous in its interpretation of what constitutes a 
reviewable act under Article 173. As stated above, this is an essential prerequisite to a party 
who wishes to challenge an act. Thereafter another hurdle must be overcome: that of 
convincing the Court that they have locus standi to challenge the act in question before the 
Court. 
The issue of third party rights is an essential element in the definition of the general principle 
of the right to be heard as stated in the Transocean Marine Paint11 case. As stated earlier, the 
right for undertakings concerned in competition proceedings to be heard is provided by 
Article 1 Regulation 99/63 and Article 19 Regulation 17/62. In relation to third parties, 
Article 3(2) of Regulation 17/62 grants the right for natural or legal persons who have a 
legitimate interest in a case to bring it to the attention of the Commission by way of a 
complaint. Thus the competition law provisions do provide for the right to be heard 
independently of Article 173. 
To provide a complete picture of third party rights in competition law, rights under 
Regulation 17/62 and Article 173 must be considered.18 
1 6 "The Nature and Binding Effect of Decisions under Article 189 EC" (1996) 21 E.LRev 3 
1 7 Case 17/74 [1974] E C R 1063 
1 8 on this see Neuwahl "Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC;Past, Present and Possible Future" (1996) 21 ELRev. Feb 
p 23 for a discussion of the interepretation by the Court of individual concern in anti-dumping cases. 
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Complainants using the provisions of Regulation 17/62 will often be competitors whose 
interests are being damaged as a result of undertakings in the market operating a cartel in 
breach of Article 85 EC.1 9 Other complaints may be caused by the refusal to supply goods to 
the complainant by an undertaking acting allegedly in breach of its dominant position and 
consequently in breach of Article 86 EC.20 
The number of such complaints submitted to the Commission has seen a marked increase in 
recent years. Vesterdorf,21 a judge of the Court of First Instance estimates that the total is 
currently 100 per year. 
The first issue to consider is how generous is the Commission in its interpretation of 
legitimate interest under Article 3 (2) of Regulation 17/62. In fact both the Court and the 
Commission have been generous in their interpretation of Article 3(2). The following is a 
limited example of parties whom the Commission and the Court have held to possess 
legitimate interest under Article 3(2): 
- a competitor 
- a competitor injured by predatory pricing 
- persons injured by a refusal to supply a dominant company. 
There are however no decisions of the Court that address the question of legitimate interest 
directly. Kerse22 suggests that a party with legitimate interest "...should be likely to suffer 
injury or loss directly". According to Vestordorf, " having a legitimate interest must 
presumably be understood as meaning that the complainant is required to demonstrate on the 
balance of probabilities that he has a reasonably direct and substantial interest in the outcome 
of the complaint". 
A further view is expressed by Temple Lang; "...the complainant should have a reasonably 
direct and practical interest in the outcome of the proceedings". 
A generous interpretation of legitimate interest can be seen in the 1985 complaint from the 
Transport and General Workers Union. The union complained on the grounds that they were 
1 9 for example Case 35/83 BAT & Reynolds v Commission [1985] ECR 363 
2 0 for example Commercial Solvents v. Commission /"1992] ECR 1105 
2 1 " Complaints Concerning Infringements of Competition Law within the Context of European Community 
Law."CML Rev. 1994 77 
2 2 "EC Antitrust Procedure" 3rd Edition p220 
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the body representing workers laid off through the closure of a petrol works due to alleged 
concerted practices between British Petroleum and Texaco. The Commission agreed. 
Even i f the third party cannot establish a legitimate interest under Article 3(2) of Regulation 
17/62, he or she should still be advised to complain to the Commission under Article 3(2)(b) 
which allows private parties to bring complaints to the attention of the Commission who can 
initiate proceedings on its own behalf under Article 3(1) of the Regulation. However parties 
who follow such a procedure are in a weaker position to those who have established a 
legitimate interest under Article 3(2). 
The reason for this is that i f the complainant is rejected by the Commission on the grounds of 
lack of legitimate interest this will be addressed to the complainant as a decision of the 
Commission. The complainant can then bring an action for annulment of that decision under 
Article 173(4) of the Treaty which provides: "any natural or legal persons may...institute 
proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against which, although in the form 
of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person , is of direct and individual concern 
to the former". 
If however the Commission has initiated proceedings on its own behalf under Article 3(1) 
based on a complaint from a third party under Article 3(2)(b) of Regulation 17/62, the 
complainant can only challenge the Decision to exempt on the grounds of it being of direct 
and individual concern under Article 173 EC. 
The issue of direct and individual concern under Article 173(4) EC is therefore crucial to the 
third party complainant in competition proceedings. 
The test established by the Court to establish direct and individual concern was first stated in 
Plaumann v. Commission2^ as: 
"Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be individually 
concerned i f that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to 
them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons 
and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person 
addressed." 
2 3 Case 25/62 [1963] E C R 95 
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The Court has adopted a more generous approach than that established in Plaumann in cases 
where Community institutions undertake what is sometimes called " quasi- judicial " 
activity.24 This includes anti-dumping measures and competition procedures. So where 
Community law grants procedural rights as it does in competition proceedings under 
Regulation 17/62, a more generous interpretation of Article 173(4) is applied. 
An example of this can be seen in Metro v. Commission(No. I).25 
In this case Metro maintained that the distribution system operated by SABA was in breach 
of Article 85 EC. Metro complained under Article 3(2) Regulation 17/62 which allows 
private parties to bring complaints to the attention of the Commission. The Commission 
decided that certain aspects of the distribution system were not in breach of Article 85 and 
addressed this decision to SABA. The issue was whether Metro could challenge the decision 
by claiming individual concern to a decision addressed to another. The Court granted Metro 
standing. It said: 
"It is in the interests of a satisfactory administration of justice and of the proper application of 
Articles 85 and 86 that natural or legal persons who are entitled, pursuant to Article 3(2)(b) of 
Regulation 17, to request the Commission to find an infringement of Articles 85 and 86 
should be able, i f their request is not complied with wholly or in part, to institute proceedings 
in order to protect their legitimate interests. 
In those circumstances the applicant must be considered to be directly and individually 
concerned, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173, by the contested 
decision and the application is accordingly admissible." 
The Court therefore in competition law cases (and to a similar degree in anti-dumping cases) 
has adopted the view that if a party has a right to intervene before an administrative agency 
(as is the case for a third party to complain to the Commission under Article 3(2)(b) ), then 
that party has a corresponding right to seek judicial review of the agency's decisions. In the 
complex area of competition law where secondary legislation has provided a sophisticated 
system of rights and obligations to undertakings as well as heavy penalties for failure to 
comply with the law, it is imperative that the right to be heard is effective. Therefore the 
2 4 see Neuwahl "Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC;Past, Present and Possible Future"(1996) 21 E L Rev.23 for further 
discussion on this point. 
2 5 Case 26/76 [1977] E C R 1875 
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ability for third parties to challenge the acts of the Commission is an essential element in the 
development of the general principles of Community law and can indeed be classed as a 
fundamental right under law. 
Whilst the Court has been generous in its interpretation of third party rights in competition 
law cases, legislative provision remains restrictive. The strict provisions of Article 173(4) 
mean that an individual who feels that they have suffered harm as a result of an act of a 
Community institution yet fails to satisfy Article 173(4) is effectively left without a remedy. 
Therefore the fundamental rights of individuals may ultimately be unenforceable due to the 
strict provisions of Article 173. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the Court of Justice has recently rejected the competency of the 
Community to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. Accession would 
require amendment to the Treaty. It appears from this study that the observance and 
enforcement of fundamental principles by the Court is rigorous when applicants satisfy the 
rules under Article 173. However, the rules under Article 173 are too strict to ensure that 
someone who claims that his or her fundamental rights have been infringed by a Community 
institution can always have recourse to the Court.26 Professors Arnull, Schermers and 
Dashwood27suggest that conditions for admissibility under Article 173 be eased to permit 
wider access to the Court. A bolder way forward would be to recognise that the right to seek 
judicial review of government action where the applicant is adversely affected is in itself a 
fundamental right that must be upheld by the Community. This could be adopted into the 
general principles of the Community on the basis of the existing laws in the member states 
and the provisions of the Convention. This would provide a guarantee to injured third parties 
that recourse to justice is available under Community law. 
2 6 this point was made in the House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Enforcement of Competition 
Policy in 1992 atpara.78. 
2 7 C E L S Occasional Paper No.l on Opinion 2/94 of March 28,1996. 
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2.5 The Role of the Hearing Officer 
In 1994 the Hearing Officer, who had been introduced into competition proceedings in 1982, 
was given new terms of reference in respect of third party rights.28Article 3 of the terms of 
reference authorises the Hearing Officer to decide, after consultation with the responsible 
Director of DG VI(the Competition Policy Directorate), whether third parties should be 
allowed to be heard. This means that the Hearing Officer has to decide whether the third 
parties have a legitimate interest falling within Article 19(2) Regulation 17/62 and Article 5 
Regulation 99/63. The Hearing Officer may only take a negative decision denying the third 
party the right to be heard after having given the third party the opportunity to comment on 
the reasons given for concluding that the third party lacks sufficient interest in the case. This 
enhancement of the role of the Hearing Officer is an important procedural development. It 
goes some way to removing some of the hitherto exclusive powers of the Commission in the 
competition law enforcement process that will be examined in detail in Chapter Three. It does 
not however alter the strict legal criteria to be satisfied under Treaty provision. Only the more 
radical proposal of the elevation of the right of judicial review for all aggrieved parties into a 
general principle of Community law would satisfy the demands of administrative justice as a 
fundamental right. 
2.6 Access to File 
According to Art Van Liedekerke,29 " the right of access to information is an essential 
component of the right to be heard and necessary to ensure the full and effective protection of 
the rights of defence". 
A final topic for discussion before ending this examination of the right to be heard is the issue 
of access to file. Although this issue does not fall within a consideration of judicial review, a 
discussion of the right to be heard would be incomplete without it. This topic also reveals the 
2 8O.J.1994 L330/67 
2 9 CMLRev. (1995) 963 
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recent changes in the Commission towards greater protection of the rights of the defence of 
the parties in competition proceedings. The impetus for these changes has been the various 
criticisms of the extensive powers of the Commission in this area as discussed in Chapter 
Three of this work. 
Prior to 1982 the right to be heard appeared to be curtailed by the inability of the complainant 
to require disclosure of the administrative file by the Commission on their case. The 
Commission was only required to disclose those documents upon which it proposed to rely. 
In VBVB and VBBB v Commission30 the Court stated: 
"... although regard for the rights of the defence requires that the undertaking concerned shall 
have been enabled to make known effectively its point of view on the documents relied upon 
by the Commission in making the findings on which its decision is based, there are no 
provisions which require the Commission to divulge the contents of its files to the parties 
concerned." 
However since the judgement in VBVB that there existed no legal duty on the Commission to 
disclose its files, the Commission has chosen to permit improved access to its files except for 
internal working documents and information protected by the rules on professional secrecy.31 
When the issue came before the Court of First Instance in 1992 in Hercules v Commission32 it 
concluded that the Commission now does have an obligation to make its files available 
subject to the exceptions referred to above. 
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, on 1st September 1982 the Commission appointed a 
Hearing Officer whose function is to preside over the hearings and to ensure that the rights of 
the defence are properly respected. He must be present throughout the hearing and has direct 
access to the Commissioner responsible for Competition for whom he prepares a report on the 
case. In ICI v Commission 3 3 however, the Court ruled that the parties are not entitled his 
report. 
3 0 Cases 43 &63/82 [1984] E C R 19 
3 1 12th Report on Competition Policy points 34-35 
3 2 Case T- 7/89 [1992] 4 CMLR 
3 3 Case 85/76 [1979]ECR 461 
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In 1994 Commission Decision of 12 December34 codifies and extends the position and 
competence of the Hearing Officer. Article 19 of Regulation 17/62 as discussed above, 
requires that the Commission before taking a decision shall give the parties concerned their 
opportunity to present their views on the matter. Access to the file of the Commission is 
therefore essential for the parties to ascertain the full details of the case. The 1994 Decision 
contains specific rules for access to and disclosure of certain documents in the Commission's 
file. It also provides for a specific procedure to be followed where an undertaking involved in 
competition proceedings has reason to believe that the Commission possesses documents 
which have not been disclosed to it where those documents are necessary for the proper 
exercise of the right to be heard. The overall effect of the 1994 Decision is to extend and 
protect the rights of defence by greater access to file. It should be noted that the Court 
differentiates between parties under investigation and third parties on the issue of access to 
the Commission's file. In Matra v Commission 3 5 the Court of First Instance emphasised that 
the rights of access are more limited in the case of third parties than the rights of parties 
actually under investigation. Subject of course to the rules of professional secrecy, it is 
difficult to sustain such a position, particularly i f the third party can establish legitimate 
concern in the case. 
The confidentiality of the Hearing Officer's report remains unchanged by the 1994 terms of 
reference for Hearing Officers. The House of Lords Select Committee recommended in its 
1993 Report that the Report of the Hearing Officer be sent to the parties. The new terms of 
reference did not implement this recommendation. Marc Van Der Woude36 supports this 
position commenting ". . . If his findings were made public, then the Hearing Officer would be 
reluctant to express himself freely, since his words might, rightly or wrongly be repeated 
during court proceedings". 
In conclusion this discussion illustrates that the development of the right to be heard in 
competition proceedings has been evolving constantly over the last two decades since the 
3 4 Commission Decision of 12 December 1994 on the terms of reference of hearings officers in competition 
procedures before the Commission, OJ 1994, L 330/67 
3 5 Case T-17/93 [1994] E C R 595 
3 6 "Hearing Officers and E C Antitrust Procedures;The Art of Making Subjective Procedures More Objective." 
CMLRev.33 1996 p531 
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Transocean case. The Court has responded carefully on this issue, ensuring that in areas such 
as competition law in which the Commission plays such a pivotal administrative role, the 
right to be heard is protected by granting a more generous interpretation on the issue 
reviewable acts and locus standi under Article 173. In addition to this the Commission has 
initiated changes in its procedures to grant parties greater access to their files. How far these 
changes go in reducing the criticism that the Commission fails to provide a fair hearing due 
to the plurality of its roles must be seen in the context of the proposed amendments to the role 
of the Commission in Chapter Three of this work. 
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Chapter Three 
The Commission and the Plurality of its Roles in Competition Law Proceedings. 
As stated in the introduction, this work attempts to examine the role of the Commission in the 
enforcement of competition policy with particular regard to the issue of general principles of 
law and fundamental rights. Perhaps the most central issue in this field, and certainly one that 
has attracted widespread comment is that of the plurality of roles adopted by the Commission 
in the enforcement process. The question of separation of powers, particularly with regard to 
investigation and enforcement is central to the fundamental right of the individual to a fair 
hearing. 
The chapter will begin with a brief outline of the role of the Commission as provided by 
legislation in the enforcement process. Thereafter a critique of the system will be discussed. 
The role of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in the enforcement process 
will then be examined. 
After consideration of the criticisms of the system under Community law, the role and 
potential impact of the European Convention on Human Rights will be scrutinised. As a 
direct source of Community law by virtue of Article F of the Treaty of European Union, 
Article 6 of the Convention which guarantees a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, poses a considerable challenge to the plurality of roles enjoyed currently 
by the Commission. The extent to which Article 6 impacts on the powers of the Commission 
will be assessed. 
3.1 The Role of the Commission in the Enforcement of Competition Law 
The legislation regulating competition policy has its source in Article 87 EC. This empowers 
the Council to adopt measures to give effect to the principles contained in Articles 85 and 86. 
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It did this in Regulation 17/62. This regulation lays down the powers of the Commission in 
the enforcement process. Further legislative provision was made to amplify enforcement 
procedures in Regulation 99/63 which is concerned with the conduct of hearings under 
Regulation 17/62. 
Under Regulation 17/62 the Commission enjoys wide powers of investigation. These powers 
are discussed at length in Chapter Four of this work. After investigation, and a finding by the 
Commission of breach of Articles 85 or 86 by the undertaking, the Commission can, under 
Article 3(1) Regulation 17/62, require the undertakings to terminate these infringements. It 
may do so either on its own initiative, upon application by a member state or by a third party 
claiming a legitimate interest. If the Commission initiates proceedings under Article 3 it must 
serve on the parties concerned a statement of objections indicating its objections to their 
behaviour. The statement of objections contains a statement of the facts and a legal 
assessment of the alleged infringement. The Commission is not permitted to take action 
against firms in respect of matters that have not been included in the statement of objections.1 
The Commission may not rely on information that it is unable to divulge because it amounts 
to a business secret.2 
The recipient of the statement of objections must reply to the Commission within a period 
fixed by the Commission. The recipient also has the right to an oral hearing. Interested third 
parties may also be heard. The rights of third parties in competition proceedings are discussed 
in Chapter Two. The conduct of hearings and the role of the Hearings Officer are also 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
Having conducted the investigation and heard the evidence of the interested parties, the 
Commission may come to a formal decision that requires that the parties terminate the 
infringement. Under Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 17/62 the Commission is empowered 
to fine firms who are guilty of offences under Articles 85 and 86. 
The decisions of the Commission are subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice and 
since 19893 by the Court of First Instance under Articles 173 and 175 EEC. Judicial review of 
1 Case 89/85 A Ahlstrom Oy v Commission [1993] 4 CMLR 407 
2 see Chapter Six of this work 
3 Council Decision 88/59l/ECSC,EEC,Eurotom of 24 Oct. 1988 (1988)O.J. L319 
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the decisions of the Commission in competition proceedings are discussed in detail in 
Chapter Two. 
From this albeit extremely brief overview of the role of the Commission in competition law 
proceedings, it is evident that the Commission exercises exclusive power at every stage of the 
enforcement process, from investigation through to prosecution and finally to the ultimate 
decision and sanction. A fundamental question for consideration therefore is whether it is 
appropriate for one body to be simultaneously the detective, the prosecutor, the negotiator 
and the decision maker. 
3.2 The House of Lords Select Committee and its Conclusions 
Many commentators on competition law have over the years remarked on the objections to 
the plurality of roles enjoyed by the Commission. "The criticism has been that the 
Commission acts as policeman, prosecutor, judge and jury and that the enforcement 
procedure is inherently unfair"4 and "...The applicable rules of procedure laid down by 
Regulation 19 remain rather "Kafkaesque" in that the Commission combines the role of 
prosecutor, judge and jury..."5 
Certainly the enforcement of Community competition policy is very different from that in the 
United Kingdom where the various functions are distributed between different institutions. 
The issue of the separation of powers in relation to the enforcement of competition policy 
was examined by the House of Lords Select Committee into the Enforcement of Competition 
Rules.6 Other bodies have also carried out reviews of the enforcement process. In the Merger 
Control Enquiry in 1989 Jeremy Lever QC proposed: 
"The establishment of a small Directorate General separate from DG IV that would be 
responsible for the formulation of Community decisions in competition cases (and anti-
4 Whish "Competition Law" 3rd edition p 286 
5 Van Bael and Bellis "Competition Law of the E E C ' p 282 
6 House of Lords Select Committee the European Communities, 1st Report Session 1993-4(HL Paper 7) 
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dumping) leaving DGIV to perform, after delivery of the Statement of Objections, only its 
present role of prosecutions."7 
In the House of Lords Select Committee initial comments on the need to review the powers 
of the Commission pointed to "...renewed anxiety about the extent to which the Commission's 
combination of administrative and judicial functions has endangered "fairness of 
enforcement" in competition matters".8 
The evidence given by experts in the competition field in the House of Lords Select 
Committee ultimately concluded in favour of maintaining the status quo. The role of the 
Court of First Instance and the existence of judicial control was central to this conclusion. 
Michael Reynolds of Allan and Overy solicitors in his evidence stated that the proposal of the 
introduction of an independent element into Commission enforcement proceedings was of 
less merit due to the establishment of the Court of First Instance.9 He felt that the Court has 
had a supervisory influence on the enforcement process by providing a greater element of 
judicial control. Further, he felt that that an independent review body might be no less 
political than the Commission and would result in protracted proceedings. 
Control by the judiciary was also relied upon by the then Director General of DG IV, Dr. 
Ehlermann. He stated that the importance of facts in the investigatory process and prosecution 
functions could not be separated without the risk that the prosecution would find certain facts 
missing and be forced to launch further investigations. It is submitted that there is an element 
of self-protectionism in such a view. Community law is littered with cases where the Court 
has annulled decisions of the Commission on the basis of incorrect facts and analysis; for 
example in the Continental Can case10 and Societa Italiano Vetro Spau, to mention only two. 
This occurs where no separation of power exists! 
Dr. Ehlerman, in defending the status quo stated that the separation of functions would not 
improve the quality of the Statement of Objections or of the Decision. He also felt that it 
7 6th Report 1988-89 Merger Control ppl 10-112 
8 ibid at paras 4,6 
9 Article 17 of Regulation 17/62 grants the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 
172 E E C to review decisions of the Commission. This role has now been assumed by the Court of First 
Instance. 
1 0 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corpn and Continental Can Co. Inc v Commission [1973] E C R 215 
1 1 Cases T 68,77,78/89 Societa Italiano Vetro Spa & Others v. Commission [1992] II-ECR 1403 
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would not make best use of limited resources. I f more resources were to be made available, 
he believed that they would be best used not by separating the Commission's powers, but by 
having large teams for complex cases as is the case in the Merger Task Force. Further, Dr. 
Ehlerman felt that should a system with separate investigation functions exist, the ability of 
the Commission to acquire information may be more difficult. This can be appreciated as an 
area of legitimate concern for the Commission. However the interests of the Commission and 
its fact finding powers are separate from those of the individual undertaking whose concerns 
are that these functions are merged. The concern of many lawyers and their clients is 
expressed by Mr. David Vaughn QC in his evidence to the Select Committee. " I would see a 
major need for a division between the inspector who comes round your offices and the case 
handler." 
On the central issue of the separation of powers, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 
its evidence to the Select Committee felt that the plurality of roles within the Commission 
was unproblematic. They stated that whilst the separation of powers existed in the United 
Kingdom competition enforcement system, it was not a fundamental pre-requisite for a 
system of enforcement. The German system of competition which does not have separation of 
powers was cited as an example of an effective and fair system.12 
The Court of First Instance itself, when considering the issue of the separation of powers in 
199213 concluded that it was not a breach of procedural rules for the same officials to be 
involved through successive stages of the investigatory process. 
After scrutinising the evidence of the expert witnesses, the Select Committee came to the 
conclusion that the involvement of the same officials throughout the stages of the 
investigation is not wrong in principle provided that the proceedings are fair and transparent 
and that there should be the possibility of independent judicial control to guarantee it "...the 
strong administrative and policy content in the enforcement of the competition rules makes it 
1 2 It is interesting to note that the Bundeskartellamt of the Federal Republic of Germany in its evidence felt that 
the E C system should be reformed and that an independent competition commission should be set up. 
1 3 Case T- l 1/89 Shell v Commission [1992] E C R 757 
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right and inevitable that the function of enforcement should be principally entrusted with the 
Commission".14 
A number of proposals were put forward by the experts who submitted comments to the 
Select Committee. One that was put forward and has since been implemented in some 
measure is the enhancement of the role of the Hearing Officer. In his evidence to the 
Committee, Mr Alan Cooper of the Department of Trade and Industry suggested that there 
was scope for enhancing the status of the Hearing Officer so that his or her view "is 
something which other officials wi l l tremble at". 
The position of the Hearing Officer was introduced in 1982 in an attempt to make oral 
hearings more objective. The intention of the Commission was to create a role from within its 
ranks to oversee the examination of evidence. This would have the effect of separating the 
officials involved in the investigatory process from the process of the hearing of the case. It 
would introduce an element of objectivity (although not independence) in the enforcement 
process. 
The post is as an officer of the Commission with a unique position that enables him or her to 
refer the observations made directly to the head of DG IV, the division of the Commission 
that deals with competition policy. Oral hearings take place after the Commission has issued 
a statement of objections against an undertaking alleging breach of Articles 85 or 86. 
Regulation 99/6315 provides that the undertakings concerned can submit their views to the 
Commission. Essentially the role of the Hearing Officer under the old terms of reference was 
threefold. First he or she was responsible for the preparation of the oral hearing. Thereafter he 
or she conducted the hearing itself. This permitted the Hearing Officer to decide whether 
fresh documents may be produced, who should be heard and whether persons should be heard 
separately or with other persons. Finally the Hearing Officer prepared a report of the hearing 
containing its detail and his or her opinion of the case. This report would then be submitted to 
the Commissioner for competition. The report remains confidential. 
1 4 Select Committee Report p.37 para 105 
1 5 O.J.Sp.Ed.1963, No. 2268/63,p.47 
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The new terms of reference of the Hearing Officer were formulated in 199416. The role has 
been extended to cover the whole of the Commission's administrative procedure. This was 
one of the main recommendations of the House of Lords Select Committee in its report in 
1993. The new role also regulates the nature of documents that can be the subject of scrutiny 
of the Commission and interested parties.17 
The enhancement of the role of the Hearing Officer is a welcome development in that it 
extends his or her competency across the range of procedures and wil l provide a greater 
element of objectivity in the process of enforcement as the Hearing Officer is involved only 
at this stage and for this express purpose. It should not however be forgotten that the Hearing 
Officer is not an independent actor and therefore does not introduce any real separation of 
powers into the enforcement process that remains exclusively in the hands of the 
Commission, of which he or she is an official. Greater enhancement of the role therefore, 
whilst being a progressive step, does not resolve the underlying issue i.e. that the 
Commission in competition law enforcement enjoys powers which exceed those which are to 
be found in the majority of similar systems of justice in the member states of the Community. 
According to Marc Van Der Woude:18 
"In any event it is legally impossible to make hearing officers truly independent. They remain 
Commission officials and the Commission ultimately bears the responsibility for their 
decisions. Only a revision of the EC Treaty would enable the creation of a really independent 
hearing officer...As long as the Commission combines and is compelled to combine the 
functions of prosecutor and judge, it can only look for means which soften the subjective 
angles of its unilateral powers. In this imperfect procedural context, the new terms of 
reference offer a major contribution to objectivity." 
From this brief account of recent debate on the issue of the concentration of powers in the 
hands of the Commission it appears that two main issues for discussion are raised. Firstly, as 
mentioned earlier, many commentators are content with the role of the Commission as they 
feel that the Court of First Instance has assumed an increasingly interventionist role and can 
1 6 O.J. 1994 L 330/67 
1 7 Chapter Six contains an analysis of these new powers. 
1 8 "Hearing Officers and E C Antitrust Procedures;The Art Of Making Subjective Procedures More Objective" 
CMLRev. 33 531 
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check the powers of the Commission. The second issue is the assumption that the lack of 
separation of powers within the system is acceptable provided safeguards exist to ensure 
impartiality. These two issues are linked as part of the safeguard to ensure impartiality in 
issue two is the provision of judicial control through the Courts. However issue two also 
raises the question of fundamental human rights as guaranteed under Article 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. These two issues wil l be discussed in turn. 
3.3 The Role of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in the Enforcement 
Process 
The Court of First Instance was introduced in the Single European Act 1986 s . l l . Section 11 
empowered the Council to attach a court of first instance to the Court of Justice. The Decision 
to do so was taken on 24 Oct 1988. The role of the Court of First Instance in competition 
proceedings is effectively the same as that of the Court of Justice. It decides on actions 
brought by natural or legal persons against the Commission under Articles 175 and 173. It 
can decide whether the Commission lacks competence in any area, whether it has infringed an 
essential procedural requirement, whether it has infringed the Treaty of Rome or any rule of 
law relating to its application and finally whether it has misused its powers. The one issue 
upon which neither the Court of Justice nor the Court of Justice can decide is the substance of 
the case. This remains exclusively in the hands of the Commission. The role of the Court is 
limited to "...verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, 
whether the statement of the reasons for the decision is adequate, whether the facts have been 
accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of 
powers".19 
Great hopes existed for the Court of First Instance when it was first introduced. Many 
commentators felt that the new Court would show a greater desire to scrutinise the work of 
the Commission. The Council in the Decision setting up the Court of First Instance stated that 
1 9 Case 42/84 RE MIA & Others v Commission [1985] E C R 2545 
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in respect of issues that required scrutiny of complex facts the new Court " wil l improve the 
judicial protection of individual interests".20 
There is no doubt that the Court of First Instance has assumed a much greater interventionist 
role in the consideration of cases before it particularly in relation to economic assessment and 
findings of facts. In a number of cases the Court has undertaken thorough reviews of the 
Commission's procedures and has been sharply critical of a number of them. An example of 
these critical reviews can be seen in the PVC cases.21 In these cases the Commission had 
imposed fines totalling 23.5 million ECU on companies alleged to have been involved in a 
cartel in the PVC market. On scrutinising the findings of the Commission, the Court found a 
number of procedural irregularities. Alterations had been made to the decision after its 
adoption by the Commission and prior to its notification to the parties. Further, there had 
been a failure to adopt the decision in the language of the Dutch and Italian defendants. The 
adoption of the decision had been delegated to the Commissioner responsible for competition 
whereas the whole Commission should have adopted it. Finally it had been signed by the 
competition Commissioner after his mandate had expired! The Court decided that the effect 
of these numerous and serious irregularities was to render the Commission decision non-
existent. "The Court is obliged to conclude that, by virtue of the particularly serious and 
manifest defects which it exhibits, the Commission "measure" ... is non-existent."22 2 3 
Another example of the scrutiny of the Court can be seen in the Italian Flat Glass cases.24 
This case concerned applications by three Italian flat glass manufacturers to annul a 
Commission decision fining them for breach of both Articles 85 and 86. In their 
investigations the Court examined the facts in minute detail. Prior to the oral hearing the 
2 0 no. 8 Recitals 
2 1 Cases T- 79, 84-86, 89, 91-92, 96, 98, 102, 104/89, BASF AG and Others v Commission [1992] E C R 11-315 
2 2 ibid at para 100 
2 3 On appeal to Court of Justice Case C-137/92 Commission v BASF and Others [1994] ECR 1-2555 the Court 
took the view that the defects were not so serious as to render the decision non-existent. The Court held that to 
conclude that a decision is non-existent, with potentially serious consequences, should be "reserved for quite 
extreme situations". The Court did, however, agree that the decision was tainted by sufficient irregularity for it 
to be annulled. The Court did therefore concur with the findings of the CFI that the Commission had infringed 
essential procedural requirements, but differed in its determination of the gravity of those infringements. The 
Court did not define the nature of irregularities "of such obvious gravity" in the adoption of a decision that they 
would render that decision so flawed as to merit it being declared non-existent rather than annulled. 
2 4 Case T-68/89 Societa Italiano Vetro Spa & Others v Commission [1992]11- E C R 1403 
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Judge-Rapporteur chaired an informal meeting of the parties with the purpose of establishing 
a single common file of documents essential to the case. This file was also to include all the 
statistics required for an understanding of the flat glass market. To this end the Commission 
was required to submit the originals of all the documents upon which they had relied in the 
case. The parties were then asked to agree the Judge-Rapporteur's report. On close 
examination the of the original documents used as evidence by the Commission it became 
clear that when the evidence had been communicated to the undertakings, certain passages of 
relevance to the case had been omitted or in some cases deliberately deleted (the passages in 
question did not refer to business secrets). On discovering these irregularities, the Court 
undertook a thorough investigation of the evidence used by the Commission to come to its 
decision. It effectively acted as an independent tribunal. It concluded that not one of the eight 
separate allegations made by the Commission on the basis of fact had been wholly 
substantiated. 
This greater scrutiny does seem to suggest that the Court of First Instance is assuming a more 
interventionist role than that previously adopted by the Court of Justice. The Court of First 
Instance has attracted many admirers. At the Select Committee of the House of Lords the 
Joint Working Party on Competition Law of the Bars and Law Societies of the UK declared 
their "...great admiration for the work of the Court of First Instance... We consider that this has 
been a development of great importance in the judicial protection of individual rights".25 
It appears that this more interventionist role on the part of the Court of First Instance does go 
some way to allay the fear of abuse inherent in any system where clear separation of powers 
does not exist. This is not however a universal view. Brent 2 6writing a critique on the issue 
stated: "It is tempting to conclude...that control by the Court of Justice of the Commission's 
use of evidence is more effective than that exercised in the past by the Court of Justice". He 
feels that there is a danger of exaggerating the novelty of the judgements of the Court of First 
Instance as the Court of Justice has itself undertaken factual investigations on a number of 
House of Lords Select Committee at p63 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol 44 April 1995 
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occasions. The example he uses is Woodpulp II.21 On this basis he concludes that the Court 
of First Instance is not unique in assuming an investigatory role on the facts. 
It is submitted that it is unimportant which court assumes such a role. The fact that the 
assumption that such a role has developed is a positive step towards introducing an element 
of independent analysis in competition proceedings. The crucial issue is whether the more 
interventionist role of the Courts has caused the Commission to review its practices - thus 
providing greater protection for the right of the undertaking concerned to enjoy a fair hearing. 
It appears however that the Commission has failed to react to the enhanced role of the Court 
of First Instance by reviewing its procedures. In the Commission's 22nd Report on 
Competition Policy the Commission, commenting on the Italian Flat Glass case made no 
references to the blatant errors and tampering with evidence that the Court concluded had 
taken place by the Commission. Instead it merely referred to lessons to be learned from the 
Court's judgement which concluded that Article 86 can be infringed by a collective dominant 
position. The only actual reference to the evidence in the case was somewhat obtuse: "There 
is another lesson to be learned..., namely the extreme importance of documentary 
evidence and the way it is presented in a competition decision".28 In the House of Lords 
Select Committee the Joint Working Party of the UK Bars and Law Societies commented, 
"That the enforcement agency can make such a remark beggars belief'. 2 9 
3.4 The Classification of Competition Proceedings 
It appears from these comments made by the Commission that it has failed to respond to the 
enhanced role assumed by the Courts. There are a number of explanations for this. One 
central issue is that of the classification of the nature of competition procedures. The Courts 
have been reluctant to establish whether competition law (which was traditionally seen as 
administrative in its nature) has a penal element to it. I f the Court had grasped this issue and 
pronounced that a penal element does exist in competition proceedings, then the burden of 
2 7 Case 89/85 A.Ahlstrom Oy v Commission [1993] 4 CMLR 407 
2 8 European Commission 22nd Report on Competition Policy para 321 
2 9 House of Lords Select Committee at p 85 
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proof placed on the Commission to establish a case would be much more onerous. This 
would act as a considerable check on the Commission and the role of the Court in the fact 
finding investigation would become central to proceeding with a case. In addition to this, by 
classifying competition proceedings as criminal in their nature, parties could effectively 
invoke Article 6 ECHR to dispute the plurality of roles of the Commission. 
The issue of the criminal nature of competition proceedings has attracted comment. In 
Polypropylene Advocate General Vesterdorf commented on the tension between "the 
procedural framework of the cases, consisting of an administrative procedure followed by a 
judicial review of legality, and the substance of the case, which all broadly exhibit the 
characteristics of a criminal law case". He went on to conclude that "any reasonable doubt 
must be for the benefit of the applicants".30 
The Court of First Instance did not expressly endorse these views in their decision in the case. 
In Woodpulp II Advocate General Darmon stated that decisions in competition law were 
"manifestly of a penal nature".31 Again the Court of Justice failed to endorse this view in its 
judgement. 
Therefore neither the Commission, the applicants nor the Court knows what level of proof is 
required in competition proceedings. Brent comments32 that " this reluctance to come to 
terms with the criminal or quasi-criminal nature of competition law has given the 
Commission excessive latitude in procedure, an area in which the Court of First Instance's 
judgements have been disappointing". 
3.5 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
The status of the Convention in Community law is discussed in detail in Chapter One of this 
work. The Convention was formally recognised as a source of Community law by Article F 
of the Treaty of European Union. Article 6(1) of the Convention states: "In the determination 
of his civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge made against him, everyone is 
3 0 Re Polypropylene Cartel [1991] E C R 869 
3 1 Case 89/85[1993] 4 CMLR 407at p539 
3 2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol 44 April 1995 at p263 
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entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law." 
As can be seen from Article 6, the issue of whether proceedings are criminal in nature is 
crucial to the application of that Article. 
In Societe Stenuit v. France^ the European Commission of Human Rights concluded that 
proceedings under French competition law, which were classed under French law as 
administrative, were in fact criminal and therefore fell within Article 6(1). The rationale 
behind the decision was that the fine imposed upon the applicant under French law was 
designed as a deterrent to those intending to prevent or distort free competition in the market. 
The legislation therefore affected the general interests of society normally protected by 
criminal law. This, according to the Court, rendered the proceedings criminal in nature. This 
decision appears similar to the views of Advocates General Darmon and Vesterdorf 
mentioned earlier. Brent in his critique of the current system states that the failure to classify 
competition proceedings as criminal in nature undermines the general principle of the right to 
a fair hearing. 
"It has left the Commission in competition cases under an uncertain (and in some respects 
lax) procedural control subject to justified criticism. It again reflects the failure of the Court 
to come to terms with the criminal nature of competition proceedings, and hence the need for 
procedural propriety to be observed at every stage." 3 4 
The question of whether the Commission is an "independent and impartial tribunal" under 
Article 6 has been raised in a number of competition law cases. In Musique Diffusion 
Francaise 3 5 the applicants argued that the Commission, in making its decision acted as 
prosecutor and judge, in violation of Article 6(1) of ECHR. They argued also that the system 
set up by the Community under Regulation 17/62 violated the Convention in its distribution 
of powers in the enforcement procedure. In his opinion in the case Advocate General Slynn 
agreed that fundamental rights as set out in the Convention do form an integral part of the 
3 3 [1992] 14 EHRR 509 
3 4 I C L Q Vol 44 
3 5 Cases 100-103/80 [1983] ECR 1825 
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general principles of Community law that must be observed in competition cases. However 
he went on to state that the Commission's functions in investigating competition cases under 
Regulation 17/62 are not subject to the provisions of Article 6(1) as the Commission cannot 
be classed as a tribunal, 
"The procedure before the Commission in such cases is not judicial but administrative...when 
discharging its functions in such cases, the Commission is not to be classed as a tribunal 
within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR...This does not mean that the Commission is exempt 
from the requirement to behave fairly: it does mean that there is no substance in the argument 
that the procedure in such cases fails to comply with Article 6(1) of the ECHR." 
In the judgement of the Court of Justice the reasoning of Advocate General Sly was followed. 
The Court gave greater detail of the administrative procedure before the Commission which 
they stated guarantees that the Commission observes the fundamental principle of 
Community law, which requires that the right to a fair hearing be observed in all proceedings, 
even those of an administrative nature. The Court found that this requirement is satisfied by 
the procedure under Regulation 17/62 under which the Commission must notify its objections 
to the undertakings concerned, give the right to reply and grant an oral hearing. Under the 
terms of Article 4 of Regulation 99/63 the Commission may, in its decision, deal only with 
those objections raised against undertakings in respect of which they have been given the 
opportunity of making known their views. Thus the Court found that the Commission was not 
a tribunal under Article 6 ECHR, but that the right to a fair hearing , which is a fundamental 
principle of Community law is guaranteed under the procedures in Regulations 17/62 and 
99/63. 
In FEDATAB36 the question of whether the Commission acts as a tribunal within the meaning 
of Article 6 was again raised. In this case the Court of Justice observed that one of the criteria 
for the existence of a tribunal laid down by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Ringeisen37 is the independence of the tribunal from the executive. According to the Court: 
3 6 Cases 209-218/78 [1980] E C R 3125 
3 7 [1979-80] 1 EHRR455 
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"Since the executive power is in fact vested in it, it is at least doubtful whether, not being 
independent of that power, it can constitute a tribunal within the above mentioned sense." 
In the House of Lords Select Committee when the issue of separation of powers and Article 6 
ECHR was addressed, the view expressed was that the "independent and impartial tribunal" 
in Article 6 constituted the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in competition 
proceedings. 
In the Polypropylene cases Advocate General Vesterdorf again stated that Article 6 ECHR 
does not apply to the Commission as it is not a tribunal within the meaning of the 
Convention. He stated: "Article 6 of the Convention ...can provide no specific underpinning 
for the call for the Commission's work to be organised in a certain way". 
If, as the House of Lords Select Committee found, the Court of First Instance and the Court 
of Justice are the "tribunal" in Article 6, do they possess the requisite characteristics to satisfy 
the Convention? In Alber & Le Compte38 the Court of Human Rights stated: 
"the Convention calls for at least one of the following systems: either the jurisdictional organs 
themselves comply with the requirements of Article 6(1), or they do not do so comply but are 
subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide a 
guarantee of Article 6." 
The Court further elaborated on the meaning of "full jurisdiction" stating that the tribunal 
must have the power to rectify factual errors as well as deciding issues of law. The roles of 
the Courts of Justice and First Instance under Article 173 do not at first glance satisfy this 
requirement. Their powers are essentially to review the decision of the Commission. However 
the recent trend of the Court of Justice to scrutinise cases in detail and rectify factual errors 
may be a move towards its acquisition of the powers of "full jurisdiction" as mentioned 
above. This, as the House of Lords Select Committee stated is to be welcomed as a greater 
protection of individual rights on the issue of a fair hearing. However it also leads to 
accusations of abuse of powers on the part of the Courts as clearly Article 173 does not grant 
them the powers currently enjoyed by the Commission under Regulations 17/62 and 99/63. 
3 8 [1993] EHRR 16 
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In conclusion it is evident that the Court of Justice is faced with a dilemma. I f the system of 
Community competition law is to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 ECHR then the Court 
of First Instance must assume a greater role in the enforcement process than that provided at 
present. To do this would require amending Regulation 17/62. Recent case law suggests that 
both the Community courts have begun to assume such a role. Only by legislating in this area 
and increasing the powers of the Courts to fully examine the merits of the case and rectify 
factual errors wi l l the Commission take notice and pay greater attention to procedural 
fairness. 
An alternative course of action would be for the Community courts to accept that competition 
proceedings are quasi criminal in nature. This would have the effect of tightening the conduct 
of the Commission in their investigations by introducing the more onerous burden of proof 
and procedural safeguards required in criminal proceedings. Therefore although the 
Commission does not fall within Article 6 ECHR, it would still conform to the safeguards 
contained therein. 
It is submitted that this is an area that requires attention. The principles contained in the 
European Convention wil l rapidly become assimilated into the body of Community law. 
Failure to act wi l l mean increasing recourse to litigation on these issues. This uncertainty 
undermines confidence in the fundamental right to a fair hearing in competition law 
proceedings. 
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Chapter Four 
The Investigative Powers of the Commission and Issues of Fundamental Rights. 
4.1 Powers of Investigation 
The incorporation of fundamental rights into the Commission's enforcement 
procedures has been an issue of particular scrutiny in relation to its powers of 
investigation. These powers are granted to the Commission under Article 14 of 
Regulation 17/62.1 
This provision grants the Commission authority to undertake all necessary 
investigations including the examination of books and other business records, taking 
copies of books and business records, asking for oral explanations on the spot and 
entering any premises, land or vehicle belonging to the undertaking.2 Officials 
authorised by the Commission to act in relation to these powers are entitled to 
exercise them on production of an authorisation in writing, specifying the subject 
matter and purpose of the investigation and the penalties for failure to supply or 
supplying incomplete books and other business records. Undertakings are obliged to 
submit to investigations ordered by a decision of the Commission. Prior to the 
investigation, the Commission must inform the relevant authority in the host state and 
identify the officials concerned.3 The domestic authorities are obliged to lend every 
assistance to the Commission officials, especially where the undertaking concerned is 
opposing the investigation.4 
There are two methods of investigation. The first is voluntary and carried out with the 
agreement of the undertaking concerned, the second is mandatory to which the 
undertaking is obliged to submit. I f the Commission considers it necessary it wil l 
1 OJSp.Ed.l962,No.204/62,p.87 
2 Regulation 17/62 Article 14(1) 
3 Article 14(2) and (3) 
4 Article 14 (4), (5) and (6). 
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proceed directly to the mandatory stage bypassing voluntary investigation. This is 
illustrated in the case of National Panasonic5 where the Court held that the 
Commission enjoyed a wide discretion as to the nature of the investigation (i.e. 
whether voluntary or mandatory) and did not need to justify its action. 
Recourse by the Commission to what has become commonly known as "dawn raids"6 
whereby Commission officials, or officials of the Member State empowered by the 
Commission attend the office of the undertaking without prior notice has raised 
concerns over fundamental rights. In recent years there has been a marked increase in 
the number of decisions under Article 14(3) (whereby the Commission issues a 
decision to investigate without prior warning). Until 1979 the Commission used its 
powers to issue decisions under Article 14(3) very rarely. Decisions only tended to be 
taken where there had been a refusal to co-operate on a voluntary basis. Between 1979 
and 1983 67 investigations were made, almost all without prior warning. In 1989 
alone 19 such investigations took place. Joshua7 puts this increase down to several 
factors. Firstly he perceives a tendency on the part of undertakings and their legal 
advisors to resist any investigation into their activities as they know that voluntary 
requests have no obligatory effect. The second reason is best taken from Joshua: 
"...the most serious violations wi l l be the best concealed. Since the fines of almost 
seven million ECU in Pioneer one can safely assume that most cartel participants have 
no desire to be caught. The days when price fixing and market sharing agreements 
were innocently notified - i f they ever existed - are past". 
The third ground is a factual one. As many decisions of the Commission have been 
annulled8 or cancelled,9 or had fines reduced10due to factual deficiencies in the 
5 Case 136/79 [1980] E C R 2033 
6 "which, since the Commission prefers to find the building open do not take place at dawn..." 
Weatherill, Cases and Materials on E C law at p 399 
7 "The Element of Surprise; E E C Competition Investigation under Article 14(3) of Regulation 
17/62"(1983) 8 E L R e v 3 
8 Case 6/72 Continental Can v. Commission [1975] E C R 495 
9 Case 73/74 Papier Peints v. Commission [1975] ECR 1491 
1 0 Case 85/76 Hoffman La Roche v. Commission [1979]ECR 461 
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Commission's case, the onus is on them to produce adequate evidence to justify and 
defend their decisions. 
Other factors that would be taken into account when deciding whether to embark on a 
surprise investigation would include the secrecy of the investigations and the past 
conduct of the undertaking. Further, "It can in general be said that the suspected 
infringement wi l l be of a type that would normally attract a heavy fine. Heroic 
measures would normally be inappropriate in a case of minor importance".11 
For Joshua then the dawn raid is required to extract information which firms would 
not volunteer and to ensure that Commission decisions are based on accurate 
information. It would appear therefore that the dawn raid is a necessary evil in the 
murky world of corporate dealings. 
Some writers have criticised the Commission for its conduct in mandatory 
investigations. Korah 1 2 discusses the action of the Commission in response to an 
undertakings failure to submit documents voluntarily under Article 14(3). Should a 
fine be imposed immediately, or a decision issued to produce those further documents 
that the Commission finds relevant to the investigation although the undertaking itself 
had not envisaged them being required? In Korah's discussion of the decision in 
FNICF13 where such a fine was imposed, she states: 
"By acting strongly and imposing a fine, the Commission may have deterred 
undertakings and associations from submitting voluntarily to inspection by mandate in 
future. Lawyers may advise that the undertaking should formally refuse to submit 
voluntarily, but at the same time inform the inspectors that i f they request any 
documents within the terms of their mandate they are likely to be produced. I f a 
problem arises over some particular group of documents the inspectors would then 
have to obtain a formal decision giving the undertaking time to consider its position 
and decide to appeal to Luxembourg." 
The problem here again is that often in investigations time is of the essence. In 
seeking to obtain a decision to require production of documents the undertaking is 
1 1 Joshua opp cit at page 45 
1 2 "Inspections under the E E C Competition rules; Dangers of Voluntary Submission." 4 B L R 23 
1 3 OJ 1982 L319/12 
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given notice and can delay production of those documents by challenging the 
decision. This could be fatal to the investigation and would also delay the suspension 
of activities breaching Articles 85 and 86. 
The major issue in relation to the investigative powers of the Commission appears to 
be the balancing of issues of natural justice and the rights of the undertakings subject 
to investigation, and the need on the part of the Commission to produce accurate 
information detailing the behaviour of the undertaking to ensure that i f a breach of 
Articles 85 and 86 has taken place any decision to suspend such activities wi l l be safe 
from challenge. It should be noted also that as in any criminal investigation, (and it is 
submitted that competition policy shares the characteristics of such proceedings as 
discussed in Chapter Three) third parties may also be suffering loss caused by the 
undertaking's alleged breach of the competition rules. These issues must be balanced 
against the rights of the undertaking under investigation. 
4.2 Issues of Natural Justice 
The question of dawn raids and issues of natural justice have been discussed by the 
Court in a series of cases,14 most recently in Hoechst v. Commission.^5 Here the 
1 4 Case 136/79 National Panasonic Ltd v. Commission [1980] E C R 2033. This was the first case to 
come before the Court in which the comparability of the "dawn raid" under Article 14 and issues of 
fundamental rights were considered. The applicants, National Panasonic, claimed that by failing to 
communicate to it the decision to investigate its offices by carrying out a "dawn raid", the Commission 
had infringed its fundamental rights. The particular rights which the applicants alleged had been 
infringed included the right to receive advance notification of the intention to apply a decision 
regarding it, the right to be heard before a decision adversely affecting it is taken and the right to use 
the opportunity under Article 185 of the Treaty to request a stay of execution. In particular the 
applicants relied upon Article 8(1) ECHR whereby "everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and correspondence". They claimed that these guarantees must be provided 
mutatis mutandis also to legal persons. 
The Court confirmed its decision in Case 4/73 Nold [1974] E C R 491 at p.507 in which it stated that 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of Community law. However it went 
on to state that whilst the provisions of Article 8(1) ECHR do provide rights which must be protected 
under Community law, the provisions of Article 8(2) acknowlege that inteference with those rights is 
permissable to the extent to which it "is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedom of others". 
The Court found that the function of the rules in Regulation 17/62 is to prevent competition from being 
distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers. It held: 
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applicants refused admission to Commission officials who wished to search their 
premises arguing that they were entitled to exclude them until a search warrant had 
been obtained through the national procedures. The Commission eventually gained 
admission this way but went on to fine the applicants for failure to comply under 
Article 14(3). The applicants challenged the decision on the grounds of the wide scope 
of the powers of investigation enjoyed by the Commission. The Court stated that in 
interpreting Article 14, particular regard had to be accorded to the rights of the 
defence. It held that some rights of the defence, particularly those relating to legal 
representation and the status of privilege applying to lawyer and client had to be 
recognised and respected at the preliminary stage of the investigation. However, 
balanced against this was the Court's recognition of the pivotal importance of the 
Commission's investigative powers in the enforcement process, particularly the need 
to secure access where undertakings were refusing to comply with their enquiries. 
The Court held: 
"That right of access would secure no useful purpose i f the Commission's officials 
could do no more than ask for documents or files which they could identify precisely 
in advance. On the contrary, such a right implies the power to search for various items 
of information which are not already known or fully identified. Without such a power, 
it would be impossible for the Commission to obtain the information necessary to 
carry out the investigation i f the undertakings concerned refused to co-operate or 
adopted an obstructive attitude." 
The Court stated that i f the Commission's entry is opposed, the entry cannot be forced. 
The Commission officials must request permission from the national courts. However 
the national courts must grant the warrant to facilitate the effectiveness of the 
Commission's actions. The effect is therefore purely procedural. The Commission 
"The exercise of the powers given to the Commission by Regulation No 17 contributes to the 
maintenance of the system of competition intended by the Treaty which undertakings are absolutely 
bound to comply with. In these circumstances, it does not therefore appear that Regulation No 17, by 
giving the Commission the powers to carry out investigations without previous notification, infringes 
the right invoked by the applicant." 
Therefore the Court, whilst acknowleging that the principles of Article 8 were applicable to an 
investigation by the Commission, found that the exception in Article 8(2) justified the action taken by 
the Commission under Regulation 17/62. 
1 5 Case 46/87 [1989] ECR 2859 
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requires a national warrant; but the national courts are obliged to grant it. According 
to Vincenzi 1 6 the decision in Hoechst is 
"...an uncomfortable compromise between the fundamental principles of national law 
and the need for effective Commission powers. In such cases there is an inevitable 
conflict between the need to give adequate notice to the person or body concerned of 
the purpose of the search (under Article 14(3)) on the one hand and, on the other, the 
difficulty of knowing precisely what is in the hands of the suspected undertaking and 
ensuring that it remains there when the officials arrive." 
The Court did however state that in the exercise of the Commission's powers, the 
Court has the power to determine whether methods of investigation taken by the 
Commission under the ECSC Treaty are excessive. 1 7This presumably would be 
applicable to the powers of investigation under Regulation 17/62. 
In Hoechst the Court discussed the application of fundamental rights in Community 
law. It restated its commitment to upholding general principles and fundamental 
rights. The applicants based their case on the fundamental right to the inviolability of 
the home. On this point the Court stated: 
" ... it should be observed that, although the existence of such a right must be 
recognised in the Community legal order as a principle common to the laws of the 
Member states in regard to the private dwellings of natural persons, the same is not 
true in regard to undertakings, because there are not inconsiderable divergencies 
between the legal systems of the Member states in regard to the nature and degree of 
protection afforded to business premises against intervention by the public 
authorities." 
Therefore the Court concluded that the right to the inviolability of the home applies 
only to domestic situations as this is the protection granted in most member states. 
The application to business premises can be legitimately denied as member states 
have no consistent pattern of laws granting such protection. 
1 6 "Law of the European Community"p.281 
1 7 see Cases 5-11 and 13-15/62 San Michele and Others v Commission [1962] E C R 449 
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4.3 Article 8(1) ECHR 
In addition to the use of Community general principles to support their case, the 
applicants in Hoechst also relied on Article 8(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. This provides" Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence". 
It must however be read in conjunction with Article 8(2) which states: 
"there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 
Again the Court held that Article 8(1) does not extend to business premises, and that 
any such protection could only be afforded in as much as it forms part of the general 
principles of Community law. As already stated, no general principle relating to 
protection of business premises was held to apply other than that which to safeguard 
due process under law. On this point the Court stated: 
"None the less, in all the legal systems of the Member States, any intervention by the 
public authorities in the sphere of private activities of any person, whether natural or 
legal; must have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by law, and 
consequently, those systems provide, albeit in different forms, protection against 
arbitrary or disproportionate intervention. The need for such protection must be 
recognised as a general principle of Community law." 
However in the recent case of Neimietz v. Germany™ before the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Court stated that Article 8(1) ECHR was not limited in application 
to a persons home and private life but that it embraced "certain professional or 
business activities or premises consonant with the object and purpose of Article 8(1)". 
In the Niemietz case the applicant was a lawyer whose offices (which were premises in 
which he also lived) were searched by the German police pursuant to a search warrant 
18[1993] 16EHRR 
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issued in the Munich District Court. The warrant ordered the search in order to obtain 
information that would reveal the identity and possible whereabouts of a third party 
who was the subject of a criminal investigation by the state. The applicant complained 
inter alia that the search had violated his right to respect for home and correspondence 
as guaranteed by Article 8. The Court decided unanimously in his favour. In its 
investigation of the relevant domestic law the Court established that under Article 
13(1) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic, the inviolability of the 
home is guaranteed. This provision has been consistently interpreted by the German 
courts to include business premises. 
The Court went on to discuss the case law of the European Court of Justice. It 
scrutinised the Hoechst decision, in which Article 8(1) ECHR was held to be 
restricted to personal freedom and could not be extended to business premises. In the 
opinion of the Court it was pointed out that on several occasions in the past19the Court 
had determined that activities of a professional nature may fall within the notions of 
"private life" and "correspondence" under Article 8(1) of the Convention. In both the 
Malone and Klass cases20 the Court held that telephone tapping poses a threat to 
privacy in terms of physical intrusion into a person's private life, even i f business 
communications were involved. 
In Chappell v. United Kingdom2^ the Court held that personal searches and searches of 
premises or property may also breach Article 8(1) where business premises are 
concerned. In Chappell an Anton Piller 2 2 order had been issued by the High Court. 
The applicant, a video tape dealer, was being sued for breach of copyright by the 
plaintiffs who obtained the order against him to search for pirate videos. The order 
was executed in the defendant's offices and home (as he lived upstairs) by five private 
persons acting for the plaintiffs, including their solicitor. At the same time, as pre-
1 9 Klass and Others v. Germany [1978] 2 EHRR at para 41 and Malone v. UK [\9%5] 7 EHRR 14 para 
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2 0 opp cit 
2 1 [1990] 12 EHRR 1 
2 2 An Anton Piller order is one by which the High Court may, without hearing the defendent, authorise 
the plaintiff in civil proceedings to search the defendent's premises to seize property that is the subject 
of court proceedings to prevent its disappearance. 
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arranged, eleven policemen executed a search warrant for obscene videos. The Court 
held unanimously that although there had been an interference with the applicants 
private life and home in the sense of Article 8(1), the grant and terms of the Anton 
Piller order issued in the case, and its manner of execution, could be justified, in terms 
of Article 8(2), as being necessary for "the protection of the rights of others". 
In Niemietz the Court in its decision recognised that the division between personal and 
professional activities is often blurred and cannot be distinguished without close 
scrutiny. 
"The scope of the right to respect for private life is such that it secures the individual a 
sphere within which he can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his 
personality...Whether or not such matters have to be considered as relating to a 
persons private sphere, as opposed to public life, depends upon the relevant features of 
the activities." 
In Niemietz the Court decided that the premises concerned, despite being business 
premises, could benefit from the protection provided for private life and home under 
Article 8(1) of the Convention. 
However, as in the Chappell case before, the Court went on to find that the search of 
the lawyers' office was justified on the grounds included in Article 8(2) and was 
therefore valid under national law. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of Niemietz on the investigative procedure of the 
Commission. Both Chappell and Niemietz shared the feature that the applicant lived 
and worked in the same premises. Such a situation is unlikely to arise in competition 
proceedings against major undertakings. Therefore Niemietz can be distinguished 
from Hoescht in this respect. 
The Court in Niemietz does appear to be open to an appreciation of the blurring of the 
private/public distinction in relation to Article 8(1). What is unclear is whether this 
applies specifically to the role of the lawyer who as the court stated enjoys a unique 
position of confidence with the client to which the public is excluded. This would 
correspond with lawyer/client privilege but here protects the lawyer in the pursuit of 
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his professional activities that the Court found involved the exercise of "domestic 
authority" in his offices. 
What is clear from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is that even i f 
the Court is prepared to apply the protection granted under Article 8(1) to a limited 
category of business situations, invariably any breach of the protection granted has 
been found to be justified by the Court under Article 8(2). Therefore one can conclude 
that i f the Commission in its powers of investigation was held to be subject to Article 
8(1) ECHR, then the action could be justified under Article 8(2). The conclusion that 
the Commission is subject to Article 8(1) would refocus attention on the procedures 
adopted by the Commission, i.e. that they are necessary and proportionate as stated in 
Article 8(2). Beyond this requirement it would appear that the Commission would be 
justified in its actions in its investigations under Article 8(2). This view is shared by 
Professor Arnull 2 3 in his discussion of the Court's Opinion 2/94 in which the Court 
declared that the Community lacked legal competency to accede to the Convention. 
According to Professor Arnull, i f the Community were to accede to the Convention 
and protection under Article 8(1) applied, invariably Article 8(2) would also be 
applicable in competition law cases. Referring to the Court's ruling in Hoescht he 
commented: "Given the derogation laid down in Article 8(2) of the Convention, it 
may be doubted whether the practical result would have been much different even i f 
the Court had accepted that Article 8(1) was applicable". 
In conclusion it appears that any authority with investigative powers wi l l be the 
subject of fierce criticism on the grounds of civil liberties. In any democratic society 
balancing individual rights and those of other parties wi l l be controversial. The 
investigative powers granted to the Commission under Regulation 17/62 are essential 
to the enforcement of competition law. As the European Court of Justice stated in 
Hoechst, in the exercise of Article 14 particular regard must be accorded to the rights 
of the defence, especially those relating to legal representation and lawyer/client 
2 3 "Opinion 2/94 and its implications for the future constitution of the Union" C E L S Occasional Paper 
No. 1 p.9 
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privilege. With these safeguards of individual rights then the investigative powers 
granted to the Commission are fundamental to the effective enforcement of 
competition policy. 
This dilemma of the balancing of economic rights against fundamental human rights 
sits at the centre of this discussion. Whilst the economic goals of the Community take 
precedence over fundamental human rights this dilemma wil l persist. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the Community must establish its true direction, whether as an 
economic community expanding to embrace new members, or as a mature economic 
community developing social and political common policy. In establishing its future 
direction it must provide certainty for the citizens of the Union in respect of their 
fundamental rights. 
However no legal system exists in which the rights guaranteed under the constitution 
are absolute. It is the balancing of fundamental rights that is the crucial feature of 
modern western democracies. Thus the guarantees contained in Article 8(1) of the 
Convention are not absolute but are subject to the provisions of Article 8(2) which 
contains a comprehensive list of justifications for breach of Article 8(1). However it is 
wrong to assume that accession to the Convention by the Community would have 
little impact as in the majority of Community law cases where Article 8(1) could be 
invoked derogation under Article 8(2) would apply. It is the status of the fundamental 
right and the ability to invoke the right with certainty which is crucial to the parties 
involved and the protection of their interests. Accession to the Convention is essential 
to provide consistent guarantees to all Community citizens that their fundamental 
rights wi l l be protected within the areas of competency of the Community. 
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Chapter Five 
Legal and Professional Privilege 
5.1 Professional Secrecy 
This chapter wi l l examine the development of legal and professional privilege as a general 
principle in EC competition policy and Community law in general. 
Article 20 of Regulation 17/62 is entitled "Professional Secrecy". It imposes on the 
Commission and the competent authorities of the member states an obligation not to disclose 
information acquired by them as a result of the application of the Regulation that is "of the 
kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy."1 
The concept of professional secrecy as outlined in Regulation 17/62 is not identical to what is 
known as legal professional privilege in English law. The English concept of privilege 
consists of: 
"...communication passing between lawyer and client conveying legal advice relating to the 
conduct of on-going litigation which may not be given in evidence or disclosed by the client 
and, without the client's consent, may not be given in evidence or disclosed by the legal 
advisor."2 
As long ago as 1833 in Greenough v GaskelP it was established that the privilege does not 
extend only to situations in which litigation is contemplated, but applies to all 
communications between client and legal advisor. 
The privilege referred to in Article 20 as professional secrecy is a reference to the concept 
known in French law as "le secret professionel." This is a wide concept that applies not only 
to lawyers but to anyone whose occupation leads him or her to be entrusted with confidential 
information. This would include members of the medical profession and government 
1 Regulation 17/62 Article 20(2) 
2 Cross and Taper on Evidence at p470 
3 [1833]1 My&K 98 
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officials. The protection provide under Article 20 is therefore wider than the concept in 
English law. 
The crucial issue however is that under English protection for legal privilege would apply in 
competition law investigations, but there is no such protection in Article 14 of Regulation 
17/62. Article 14 provides that: 
"In carrying out the duties assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions adopted under 
Article 87 of the Treaty, the Commission may undertake all necessary investigations into 
undertakings...To this end the officials authorised by the Commission are empowered (a) to 
examine the books and other business records :(b) to take copies of or extracts from the books 
and business records..." 
There is no mention of "le secret professionel" in relation to Article 14. Therefore it appears 
from the 1962 Regulation that no protection of lawyer/client communications was intended to 
be afforded in the investigatory powers of the Commission. 
It appears that in the early years of the implementation of Articles 85 and 86 the absence of 
any reference to such protection under Article 14 posed no particular problems.4 However 
after the accession of the new member states in 1973, the subject became one of increased 
attention. 
5.2 The History of the Debate 
In 1976 the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the EC (the CCBE) 
published a report entitled "The Professional Secret, Confidentiality and Legal Privilege in 
the Nine Member States of the EC" (also known as the "Edward Report" after its author.) 
The Report concluded that the differences between the laws of the various countries were, 
"differences of approach or method (made necessary by their fundamentally different legal 
systems) rather than differences of result." 
4 According to evidence given by the Commission to the Court in its submission in Case 155/79 AM&S Europe 
Ltdv. Commission [1982] E C R 1575 
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In 1977 two members of the Legal Service of the Commission, Dr. Ehlerman and Dr. 
Oldekop, wrote a paper for the following year's Congress of the FIDE. They outlined the 
extent of legal privilege in all the member states, largely agreeing with the earlier Edward 
Report, Thereafter they discussed the legislative history of legal privilege in the EC context. 
Privilege was a topic for deliberation during the debate by the European Parliament on the 
adoption of Regulation 17/62. The Parliament produced the "Deringer Report" in which they 
made recommendations in favour of adoption of professional privilege in Article 14 but this 
recommendation was not followed by the Council. Dr. Ehlerman stated that the renewed 
attention to the absence of privilege in Article 14 after the accession of the new member 
states was due to the extensive protection of professional privilege in both the UK and Ireland 
where protection extends to both independent and in-house lawyers. He concluded that 
"Considering the legal situation in the member-states it seems justified to assume that there 
exists a general principle of law, applicable in Community law as part of the "law" in the 
sense of Article 164 EEC... which, within certain limits, assures the professional privilege, 
also in administrative proceedings." 
On the issue of in house lawyers who are excluded from privilege protection in some member 
states he comments 
"...in the context of of a comprehensive and balanced solution of all the issues involved, there 
seems to be no reason to treat salaried lawyers employed by their client differently from 
independent lawyers in professional practice, provided that they are effectively subject to 
similar rules of professional ethics and discipline." 
The debate continued in 1978 when the Commission gave its official response to a question 
put down by M . Couste in the Parliament.5 The Commission reiterated the absence of 
privilege protection under Article 14, but stated that 
"...the Commission, wishing to act fairly, follows the rules in the competition law of certain 
member states and is willing not to use as evidence of infringements of the Community 
competition rules any strictly legal papers written with a view to seeking or giving opinions 
on points of law to be observed or relating to the preparation or planning of the defence of the 
firm or association of firms concerned. When the Commission comes across such papers it 
5 Written Question no. 63/78 
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does not copy them. Subject to review by the Court of Justice, it is for the Commission to 
determine the nature of a given paper." 
5.3 AM&S Ltd Europe v Commission 
The issue of legal professional privilege was finally addressed by the Court in AM&S Europe 
Ltd. v. Commission.6 
AM&S, a company based in the United Kingdom, sought the annulment of a Commission 
decision under Article 173 EC requiring the Commission to produce for examination certain 
documents that it claimed were protected by legal privilege. The disputed Decision was based 
on Article 14(3) Regulation 17/62. 
In the first Opinion of Advocate General Warner the history of the debate of the professional 
privilege issue was outlined. He went on to discuss the views of the UK and French 
governments who presented opinions in the case. 
The UK position was that i f the Court was to decide that there was no principle of 
Community law on the issue of professional privilege, the solution might lie in holding that in 
the absence of any relevant Community law, the provisions of the national law of each 
member state should be applied in relation to documents found in that member state. 
According to the UK government this solution would ensure that the expectations of those 
who obtained legal advice in each member state were not disappointed. Therefore the same 
rights could be invoked against the EC authorities as against the national authorities. In 
support of this the UK cited Commission v. Italy.1 
Advocate General Warner rejected this view on the basis that in the Preamble to Regulation 
17 there is repeated reference to the need for Articles 85 and 86 to be applied in a uniform 
manner and specifically so in the Commission's powers to undertake investigations. 
In the opposing camp the French government denied the existence of a principle of legal 
privilege in relation to Article 14. This denial was based on two grounds: 
6 see footnote 4 supra 
7 Case 267/78 [1980] ECR31 
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a) that there was no express provision of EC law imposing such a restriction and 
b) that the relevant laws of the member states were too disparate for any general principle to 
be derived from them. 
Advocate General Warner stated that although the first point is correct, it is not a bar to the 
development of general principles of EC law. He remarked 
"The Court, however, has never regarded the absence of an express provision as precluding it 
from holding that a general principle of law could affect the application of Community 
legislation. Were it otherwise, Community law would admit for example, of no principle of 
proportionality, of no protection for legitimate expectations, of no right to be heard (unless 
expressly provided for) and of no guarantee of fundamental human rights." 
On the second ground of objection made by the French, Advocate General Warner stated that 
i f a general principle can be extracted from the laws of the member states "...it matters not i f 
its conceptual origin, the methods whereby it has been developed or even the scope of its 
application in detail, differ from member state to member state." 
AG. Warner agreed with the CCBE's Edward Report on the status of legal professional 
privilege in the member states as stated earlier. He disagreed with the submission of AM&S 
(the applicant) and the CCBE that the right to confidential communication between lawyer 
and client was a fundamental human right. This proposition he believed can be rejected on the 
grounds that there is no mention of such protection in the European Convention on Human 
Rights or in the constitution of any member state. He also pointed out that the right can be 
overridden or modified by the appropriately worded statute as can be seen in the case of 
England, France and Belgium. 
The second Opinion in the case was delivered by Advocate- General Slynn. He summarised 
his examination of the issue by stating that "The essential enquiry is, first, whether there is a 
principle of Community law existing independently of the Regulation, and secondly, whether 
the Regulation does, on proper construction restrict the application of that principle." 
70 
He felt that unanimity of laws across the member states was not essential in the development 
of general principles of EC law. He used the example of the Transocean Marine Painfi case 
where it was accepted that the right to be heard existed even though the rule "audi alteram 
partem" existed only in some member states. 
He went on to agree with the personal opinions of Drs Ehlerman and Oldekop that protection 
should be afforded under Article 14 in some circumstances by virtue of the existence of a 
general principle of EC law. 
AG Slynn went on to discuss the issue of in-house lawyers. AG Warner had felt that in-house 
lawyers were not covered by the general principle of privilege as they operated effectively as 
employees and were therefore not independent and may not be subject to the rules of 
professional bodies due to their status as in- house lawyers. In some of the member states full 
time employment is incompatible with the ful l professional status of a lawyer (in Belgium, 
France, Italy and Luxembourg). In other member states the employed lawyer remains subject 
to professional discipline and ethics (as in the UK and Ireland). 
On this topic Drs Ehlerman and Oldekop differed from AG Warner. They stated "...there 
seems to be no reason to treat salaried lawyers employed by their client differently from 
independent lawyers in professional practice, provided that they are effectively subject to 
similar rules of professional ethics and discipline." 
AG Slynn agreed with this view. He pointed out that an independent lawyer may act 
exclusively for one client for long periods of time. To differentiate therefore between the in-
house lawyer and the independent lawyer would be patently unfair (always with the proviso 
that the in-house lawyer is professionally qualified and subject to rules of professional 
discipline). Indeed AG Slynn intimates that to hold otherwise is almost offensive: 
" I would reject any suggestion that lawyers...who are employed full-time by the Community 
institutions, by government departments, or in the legal departments of private undertakings, 
are not to be regarded as having such professional independence as to prevent them from 
being within the rule." 
8 Case 17/74 [1974] 1063 
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The decision in AM&S confirms the opinions of the Advocates General as to the existence of 
a general principle of privilege in lawyer/client communications. This principle therefore 
applies to Article 14 of Regulation 17 (indeed it should also apply to Article 11 Regulation 17 
which is also silent on the issue of privilege). It also laid out the extent to which the privilege 
applies. 
"...to ensure that the rights of the defence may be exercised to the ful l , and the protection of 
the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client is an essential 
corollary to those rights. In those circumstances, such protection must, i f is to be effective, be 
recognised as covering all written communications exchanged after the initiation of the 
administrative procedure under Regulation 17 that may lead to a decision of the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty or to a decision imposing a pecuniary sanction on the 
undertaking. It must also be possible to extend it to earlier written communications which 
have a relationship to the subject matter of that procedure." 
5.4 The Position of the In-House Lawyer 
However the decision of the Court limited privilege to the client and the independent lawyer, 
excluding the in-house lawyer who is bound to his client by the relationship of employment. 
On these grounds the Commission decision requiring the production of documents falling in 
the privileged category was held to be void. 
In the later case of Hilti AG v. Commission9 the issue of privilege was again discussed. The 
case involved the application of privilege to documents containing legal advice. These 
documents were internal to the undertaking reporting the content of legal advice received 
from independent legal advisors. They took the form of internal notes distributed within the 
undertaking and prepared by the undertaking so that the legal advice received from 
independent lawyers could be considered by managerial staff. 
The Court held that such documents should be privileged as to hold otherwise would be to 
frustrate the protection afforded to lawyer /client communications. 
Such protection wil l only apply to internal notes that are confined to reporting the text or the 
content of those communications. 
9 Case T-30/89A [1990] 4 CMLR 602 
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On the question of who should adjudicate claims of privilege, the Court held in AM&S that it 
(or now the CFI) should assume this role. The Court felt that it was preferable for the 
Commission not to select documentation in the interests of confidentiality. Therefore in any 
case of dispute over which documentation is privileged, the Commission must take a formal 
decision requiring its production. This Decision can then be appealed to the CFI under Article 
173 who will adjudicate the case. 
The Commission, in its 12th Report on Competition Policy, made a number of comments 
clarifying its interpretation of the AM&S case. They confirmed the extent of privileged 
documents i.e. "...all written communications exchanged after the initiation of administrative 
enquiries and all earlier written communications which have a relationship to the subject 
matter of those enquiries." They also confirmed the exclusion of in- house lawyers' 
communications from this protection. 
Indeed the Commission has maintained this view due to its obvious utility in competition law 
infringement enquiries. In the case of John Deere10, the Commission relied on memoranda of 
in-house counsel to establish the intentional nature of the infringement and therefore imposed 
a heavier fine. It has however relaxed its position on independent lawyers from outside the 
EC who were excluded from privilege along with in-house lawyers in AM&S. Such a policy 
of exclusion was blatantly discriminatory. Appreciating this, the Commission in its 13th 
Report on Competition Policy No. 78 extended legal privilege to independent lawyers from 
outside the EC by way of bilateral agreements on the basis of reciprocity. It did so "...in the 
interests of international equity and to avoid any deterioration of relations between the 
Community and countries in which the professional ethics are respected..." The legal 
mechanism for such negotiations is a mandate from the Council to the Commission enabling 
it to negotiate agreements in accordance with Article 228 and based on the legislative powers 
granted by Article 87 of the EEC Treaty. There are two categories of foreign independent 
lawyers; those from jurisdictions where rules on the protection of legal papers exist and are 
applied to communications with lawyers entitled to practise in a member state ("Community 
lawyers") and those from jurisdictions where communications with Community lawyers are 
1 0 (1985) O J L 35/85 
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not protected. The first group of countries includes the USA and most EFTA countries. The 
Community would conclude agreements confirming and safeguarding the position of 
Community lawyers and extending protection in the Community to lawyers of the other 
jurisdiction. The Community would propose to conclude agreements with jurisdictions in the 
second group based on the principles of reciprocity and equal treatment. 
For such agreements to be concluded successfully, two conditions must be fulfilled: firstly 
the foreign independent lawyers must have an independent status and be subject to rules of 
professional ethics and conduct similar to those which prevail in the Community and, 
secondly, the foreign state involved must guarantee reciprocity by protecting the 
confidentiality of communications with independent Community lawyers. As established in 
AM&S all in house lawyers would be excluded from protection.11 Since these proposals were 
made in 1985 very little progress has been made on the issue of extending privilege to non 
EC lawyers. No reference was made to non EC lawyers in Hilti mainly because the issue did 
not arise. The situation remains currently unresolved. 
The exclusion of in house-lawyers from protection is an area of legitimate concern. As AG 
Slynn observed in AM&S, such exclusion undermines the professionalism of 
lawyers in many employment positions, particularly in the public sector. Of course AG 
Slynn would want the protection extended only to lawyers who are members of professional 
bodies. The rationale of the Court appears to be that the employment relationship interferes 
with the independence of the in- house lawyer. The exclusion from protection is therefore not 
wholly based on the membership or otherwise of a professional body imposing their rules and 
ethics. 
1 1 see further Faull "The Enforcement of Competition Policy in the European Communituy: A Mature System" 
(1991) FordhamCorp. L . Inst. ed.Hawk 139 at p 151 
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5.5 Proposals for Reform 
After AM&S it was expected that the Commission would make a concession in favour of in-
house lawyers. 12Tn response to criticism of the exclusion of in house lawyers in that case, the 
Commission issued a statement explaining its position.1 3 
The Commission rejected the idea that it might exercise administrative discretion by 
extending privilege in practice between undertakings and those in-house lawyers who were 
members of professional bodies and qualified to practise independently. It felt that to do so 
would create differences in the conduct of competition investigations between the legal 
systems of the various member states and would be contrary to the ratio decidendi in AM&S. 
Further, the Commission stated that i f it were to renounce the exercise of power of 
investigation conferred upon it by Regulation 17/62, (and upheld by the Court in AM&S), it 
would be an infringement of the Treaty. The conclusion of the Commission was therefore that 
for any concession to be made to in-house lawyers on the question of privilege, Community 
legislation would be required, rather than the exercise of the Commission's administrative 
discretion. Any such legislation could be ruled out in the absence of Community wide 
uniformity in the status and treatment of in-house lawyers. 
This statement was subjected to scrutiny Jonathan Faull, 1 4 himself at that time working for 
the Commission in the Directorate General IV. 
Faull takes issue with the Commission's view of why an administrative action whereby it 
refrained from exercising certain powers (i.e. examination of communication between in-
house lawyers and their clients) would constitute a breach of the Treaty. Two issues arise 
here. Firstly, the Treaty provides that by virtue of Article 89 the Commission shall investigate 
cases of suspected infringement by the Commission. Secondly, under Article 14 of 
Regulation 17/62 the Commission may undertake all necessary investigations and to this end 
officials are empowered to examine and copy books and records. 
1 2 as assumed by Boyd (1982) 7 E L Rev 493 
1 3 Bull ECD 6-1983 pt.2.1.6. 
1 4 (1983) 8 E L Rev. 411 
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Therefore it appears that there is an obligation to investigate under Article 89, but Regulation 
17 allows an element of discretion. 
In AM&S the Court held that protection would be granted to documents falling within the 
confidentiality category (i.e. those which constituted communication between independent, 
professionally qualified lawyers subject to professional body control). Documents outside this 
category (i.e. communications with in-house lawyers) fall fully within Article 14(1). This 
allows the Commission to require production of documents that it deems necessary to pursue 
its investigations. Can it therefore refrain from requiring production of documents when it 
deems it to be unnecessary? 
The Commission does not feel that such discretion exists. Faull disagrees, albeit on different 
grounds. Technically a complainant could seek judicial review of a Commission decision not 
to seek documents that it is empowered to obtain.15 Even i f the issue of such a judicial review 
is set aside, Faull argues that "...it cannot be the Commission's general contention that all the 
powers conferred on it by legislation in pursuance of a Treaty objective must be exercised in 
full and at all times, for if that were so administrative discretion and flexibility would be 
utterly discarded." 
However Faull believes that in cases where the Treaty lays down an objective (Article 3(f)), 
precise rules for the attainment of that objective (Articles 85 and 86), an obligation on the 
part of the Commission to enforce those rules (Articles 89 and 155), and provides for the 
enactment of legislation to give effect to those rules (Article 87), the legislation adopted i.e. 
Article 14(1) Regulation 17, obliges the Commission to use fully the means provided. In 
these circumstances Faull believes that any discretion that the Commission might otherwise 
have had is eliminated. Any concession to in-house lawyers on this rationale would infringe 
Articles 87 and 155 as implemented by Regulation 17. 
The Commission also rejected the suggestion of a legislative amendment of Regulation 17 to 
include in-house lawyers. It did so on the grounds of the absence of uniformity as to the status 
of in-house lawyers amongst member states. This is logical and fair although Faull believes 
1 5 under Article 173 E E C to bring an annulment of a Commission decision. In Case 26/76 Metro v. Commission 
[1975] ECR 1875 the Court held that had locus standi under Article 173 to bring a case. 
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that the real solution would be for the Council to adopt legislation to harmonise the status of 
in-house lawyers throughout the EC. Writing in 1983 Faull could not appreciate the change in 
approach to harmonisation adopted by the Council and the Commission. In the 1970s the 
momentum towards harmonisation led to the implementation of directives covering various 
professional groups.16 The lawyers Directive 77/249 granted limited freedom to lawyers 
under Article 59 to pursue professional activities in member states and provide services. The 
Directive does not apply to those exercising the freedoms conferred by Articles 48 or 52. It 
would therefore be of no assistance to the in-house lawyer whose rights are derived from the 
status as a worker under Article 48.17 
Since the 1970s there has been a move away from the extremely complex implementation of 
harmonisation directives towards a system of mutual recognition. This can be seen in 
Directive 89/48 which deals with the mutual recognition of higher education diplomas. 
Directive 89/48 applies to regulated professions. It applies to lawyers who qualify as workers 
under Article 48 and to self-employed lawyers under the provisions of Article 52. It therefore 
benefits both in-house and independent lawyers where, in the member state in question, the 
profession is regulated. Beyond the matters covered by the Directive, both in-house and 
independent lawyers remain subject to the non-discriminatory rules, (including those on the 
status of the in-house lawyer), applied in the host state. 
In the absence of protection the undertaking must pay attention to their communications with 
in-house legal staff ensuring that there is nothing to compromise the undertaking should an 
investigation be ordered by the Commission. Sensitive material and advice must be handled 
by independent lawyers even though the in-house lawyers maybe subject to the same 
disciplines and membership of the same professional body as the independent lawyer. 
In conclusion it can be observed that the establishment of legal and professional privilege is 
now fully established as a general principle of Community law. Its development follows a 
similar route to that already examined in the general principles covered in this work. However 
1 6 for example the doctors directives 75/362 E E C and 75/363 
1 7 Article 48 provides for freedom of movement of workers to accept offers of employment made in the member 
states as an employee 
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the problem exposed by the failure to protect in-house lawyers leaves an important gap in the 
application of the principle. It appears that the absence of uniformity in the status of in-house 
lawyers combined with the retreat of the Community from attempts at harmonisation will 
result in the continued denial of legal professional privilege to communications between in-
house lawyers and their clients/employers. 
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Chapter Six 
Issues of Confidentiality 
6.1 Legislative Provision 
The confidentiality of information that is the subject of an investigation under the provisions 
of Regulation 17 is one that raises a conflict between two general principles of Community 
law, that of the right of interested parties to have access to the Commission's file, and the 
right of interested parties to be protected from disclosure of confidential information. 
Confidentiality is of primary importance in the field of competition policy. Undertakings 
under investigation do not want details of their agreements to become public knowledge. 
Similarly undertakings would not want a dominant firm about whom they had complained to 
the Commission to discover the source of the complaint for genuine fear of reprisals.1 
However the Commission has a duty under Article 19(1) and (2) to hear all interested parties 
and this will inevitably lead to some situations where information must be divulged which 
was gathered from one source to facilitate prosecution of a case against another firm. 
The EC treaty and secondary legislation contain four provisions for protection against the 
disclosure of confidential information. 
Regulation 17/62. Under Article 19 of the Regulation which covers the hearing of the parties 
and of third persons, subsection 3 states: 
"Where the Commission intends to give negative clearance pursuant to Article 2 or take a 
decision in application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, it shall publish a summary of the 
relevant application or notification and invite all interested third parties to submit their 
observations within a time limit which it shall fix being not less than one month. Publication 
shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business 
secrets.,r2 
1 Case T- 65/89 BPB Industries pic v Commission where the Court stated at para 33 that the Commission is not 
obliged to disclose documents to a dominant firm which would reveal the identity of the complainant. 
2 italics added 
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Article 20 deals specifically with professional secrecy. Article 20(1) provides that 
information obtained in the course of an investigation must only be used for the purpose of 
the relevant request or investigation. Under subsection 2 it states: 
"Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 19 and 21, the Commission and the 
competent authorities of the Member states, their officials and other servants shall not 
disclose information acquired by them as a result of the application of this Regulation and of 
the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy." 
Article 21 is concerned with the publication of decisions. Under subsection 2 it states: "The 
publication shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the decisions; it shall 
have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business 
secrets." 
Article 214 of the EC Treaty provides more general protection of confidential information. It 
states: 
"The members of the institutions of the Community , the members of committees, and 
officials and other servants of the Community shall be required, even after their duties have 
ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional 
secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost 
components." 
6.2 The Scope of Professional Secrets 
In the Twelfth Report on Competition Policy the Commission first formulated the rules of 
which types of documents it considered to be confidential. These are 
"(i) documents or parts thereof containing other undertaking's business secrets 
(ii) internal Commission documents, such as notes, drafts or other working papers 
(iii) any other confidential information, such as documents enabling complainants to be 
identified where they wish to remain anonymous, and information disclosed to the 
Commission subject to an obligation of confidentiality." 
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The Court has however never stated precisely which types of information are covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy. In a number of continental systems the obligation may 
arise by virtue of the relationship in which the information is transferred rather than the 
character of the information itself. The concept of the secret professionel is similar to legal 
privilege in English and Scots law, although in some countries it extends beyond the lawyer-
client relationship. 
In the United Kingdom various degrees of protection of secrets is granted by, inter alia, The 
Official Secrets Act, the law of contract, the law relating to breach of confidence and the rules 
of evidence, for example as they apply in the case of legal professional privilege. In 1975 the 
CCBE in the Edward Report3 studied the different rules of professional secrets in the legal 
systems of the seven counties who at the time made up the Community. In France, Belgium 
and Luxembourg, the professional secret is one that is of an intimate moral or material 
character.4 However the question of whether an item of information is a secret is a question of 
fact in each case. In these countries the obligation of professional secrecy applies even where 
the facts can be known by others. It appears from the Edward Report that the national laws 
stress the professional relationship rather than the nature of the secret involved. This is not 
strictly the case under Community law. It appears that the concept is wider and covers all 
information received by Commission officials in the course of their duties whether or not the 
parties request that it be treated as confidential. According to Kerse:5 
"...there is a case for saying that the obligation of professional secrecy covers all information 
received by the Commission in the exercise of its functions under the Competition Rules, and 
in particular Regulation 17 and the other implementing regulations, with the exception of 
material which is in the public domain." 
6.3 Business Secrets 
Under Article 20(2) of Regulation 17 express provision is made for business secrets. Business 
secrets can be identified as a more restrictive category of secrets compared to the more 
3 "The Professional Secret, Confidentiality, and Legal Professional Privilege in the Nine Member States of the 
European Community" (1975), by D.A.O.Edward QC. 
4 "tout ce qui a un caractere intime que le client a un interet moral et material a ne reveler"ibid at para 24 
5 E C Antitrust Procedure 3rd Edition p 307 
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general professional secret. The term covers protection of confidential know-how and other 
technical information.6 According to Kerse7 
"The Commission has taken the view that whilst a competitor's prices and other trading 
conditions can often be found out by inquiry or own customer feedback, accurate information 
on quantities sold and market share is normally considered a trade secret which confers 
legitimate competitive advantages and thus not to be revealed or shared with competitors." 
In Hoffman La Roche* sales figures, estimates of market shares and business forecasts were 
held to merit protection as a business secret. Information given to banks, professional 
advisors and tax authorities should also remain confidential and be protected from disclosure 
to third parties. 
Article 20(2) is stated expressly to be "without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 19 and 
21". Article 19 covers the right to be heard and Article 21 covers the publication of decisions. 
It is clear therefore from the wording of Regulation 17 that some circumstances may arise 
where the Commission may disclose information that falls within the category of professional 
secrets where the public interest is at stake. "The obligation of professional secrecy is not 
intended to frustrate the enforcement of the Treaty."9 The Commission must therefore balance 
the interests of the undertakings concerned and those of complainants and third parties when 
considering disclosure of professional secrets. Business secrets however enjoy a more 
privileged position which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
6.4 Article 20(1) Limiting the Use of Information to the Investigation Underway. 
Article 20(1) limits the use of the information acquired by the Commission, or by the national 
courts acting pursuant to Regulation 17, so that it may not be used for purposes other than the 
6 see Boussois/Interpane [1984] CMLR 124. Here the Commission considered certain unpatented know-how to 
be secrets where the know-how package as a whole was not readily available or in the public domain, although 
some parts were known. 
7 E C Antitrust Procedure 3rd Edition p308 
8 Case 85/76 [1979] E C R 461 
9 Kerse ibid at p309 
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particular investigation underway.10 In Direccion General de Defensa de la Competencia v 
Asociacion Espanola de Banca Privadau the Court was asked to rule on the legitimacy of the 
use by national competition authorities of information received from the Commission 
pursuant to its requests for information under Article 11 of Regulation 17 or supplied in 
requests or notifications under Articles 2,4 and 5. The Court held that Article 20(1) prohibited 
authorities holding information from using it for a purpose other than that for which it had 
been required. In SEP v. Commission12 the Court stated that competent competition 
authorities may not disclose information to government departments responsible for State 
businesses that compete with the undertaking concerned. The use of the information must 
respect the legal context for which it had been acquired. Undertakings should however be 
cautious about disclosing business secrets on a voluntary basis prior to the decision to initiate 
an investigation as such information will not be protected under Article 20(1). Such 
information could be used for purposes other than the investigation that has been initiated. 
Such information could not of course be disclosed i f it satisfies the requirements of Article 
20(2). 
6.5 Disclosure of Professional Secrets to the Commission in the Course of the 
Investigation. 
As discussed in Chapter Four the powers of investigation of the Commission under Article 14 
are extensive. Under Article 14(1), for the purposes of the investigation, the Commission has 
the powers inter alia to examine the books and business records of the undertaking under 
investigation. According to Joshua,13 an official of DG IV, the power to examine business 
records is "wide enough to cover all documents relating to the commercial activities of the 
company". 
1 0 However, the Court of Justice in Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v Commission /1989] ECR 3150, at paral9, has 
ruled that the Commission may choose to initiate an investigation to verify or add to information obtained 
during a prior investigation 
1 1 Case C67/91 [1992] ECR I- 4785 
1 2 Case T-39/90 [1991] ECR 1497 
1 3 "The Element of Surprise: E E C Competition Investigation under Article 14(3) of Regulation 17" (1983) 8 
E.L.Revatp. l l 
83 
In AM&S 1 4 business records were said to refer to "documents concerning the market 
activities of the undertaking". All documents related to the business of an undertaking are 
therefore open to inspection. In Commission Decision FIDES,15 the Commission stated that it 
can examine any documents, even those containing business secrets, "business secrets cannot 
be invoked against Commission officials acting pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation 17". 
As already stated, Article 20 imposes on the Commission a legal obligation not to disclose 
professional secrets. This covers all confidential information acquired by the Commission in 
the exercise of its duties and includes business secrets disclosed during an investigation. As a 
result of this guarantee of protection against disclosure by the Commission to other parties, 
undertakings cannot refuse to supply documents containing business secrets during 
investigation. 
Protection against disclosure of business secrets does not therefore extend to the investigatory 
stage of the proceedings. This has been challenged by various parties on a number of 
occasions. 
In Commission Decision FNICF16 it was argued that documents containing confidential 
information should not be disclosed to the Commission during an investigation. The 
Commission rejected this stating that "undertakings may invoke the confidentiality of such 
documents only within the framework of Article 20 of Regulation 17". 
In 1976, the Law Society and the Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar proposed that 
Articles 11,12 and 14 of Regulation 17 should contain a right to refuse to supply information 
if: 
"the documents, or part of the documents, or the information requested, would disclose 
technical or commercial secrets, the disclosure of which to any source (even with the 
protection of Article 20) would cause great harm to the business, and the Commission has 
failed to show that they are sufficiently material to justify disclosure."17 
1 4 Case 155/79,[1982] E C R 1575 atp.1610 
1 5 O.J. 1979 
1 6 L319/12;O.J.1982 ; [1983] 1 C.M.L.R.575 atp 580 
1 7 Unpublished Memorandum by the Law Reform Committees of the Council of the Law Society and the 
Senate of the Inns of Court on the Investigatory Procedures of the Commission under Articles 11,12 13 and 14 
of Regulation No. 17, March 1976, figure 25(c). 
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The rationale behind the Commission's powers to examine all documents including those 
containing business secrets at the investigatory stage is to permit access by the Commission 
to the maximum range of materials to facilitate an informed opinion whether to proceed with 
the investigation and upon which grounds. Lavoie18 separates the Commissions proceedings 
into two. The investigatory stage is a fact finding exercise and is therefore of an 
administrative nature and no contradictory procedure is involved. Therefore the Commission 
should have access to all documents. The second stage begins from the point at which the 
Commission issues the formal statement of objections. Hereafter "the procedure, whilst 
remaining administrative, progresses to a more adversarial stage where the Commission is 
acting quasi- judicially". Consequently protection should be effective from this stage. The 
situation in relation to business secrets is analogous to that of the right to be heard. The 
Commission is not required to give parties the opportunity to be heard during the 
investigatory process. However the rule of audi alteram partem applies once a statement of 
objections has been issued and applies throughout the proceedings thereafter. 
As already discussed in Chapter Four, the investigative powers of the Commission are subject 
to some limitations. In Hoechst19 the Court stated that the investigative powers of the 
Commission "cannot be interpreted in such a way as to give rise to results which are 
incompatible with the general principles of Community law and in particular with 
fundamental rights". Therefore documents that fall into this category are protected from 
disclosure to the Commission during the investigatory process. This category of documents 
covers those which fall within legal and professional privilege as discussed in Chapter Five. It 
does not extend to the protection of disclosure of business secrets. 
One method of ensuring the protection of business secrets would be to elevate the 
confidentiality of business secrets into a general principle of Community law by examination 
of the status of the rule in the legal systems of other member states. This process was again 
discussed in Chapter Five in relation to legal and professional privilege. It appears that the 
adoption of confidentiality of business secrets as a general principle granting protection 
1 8 Chantal Lavioe "The Investigative Powers of the Commission with respect to Business Secrets under 
Community Competition Rules" E.L.Rev. 1992 vol 17 20. 
1 9 Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst A.G. v Commission /1982] E.C.R. 2859 at para 12 
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during the investigatory process is unlikely. This is because provision exists under Article 20 
to protect the secrets from disclosure to other undertakings. Further is has not been 
established that any more protection than this is required, i.e. that disclosure to the 
Commission at the investigative stage would have any detrimental effect to the undertaking. 
According to Lavoie: 
"The purpose of protecting business secrets is mainly to prevent competitors (or the "owner" 
of the business secret) from gaining access to the information; the interest of the Commission 
in gaining access to the business secret is to obtain evidence. Such purpose is not imperilled 
by supplying business secrets to officials of the Commission who respect procedural 
requirements and who are further bound by an obligation of professional secrecy...provided 
the business secret is otherwise and thereafter sufficiently protected against disclosure to 
other parties once it is given to the Commission for examination." 
This contrasts with the position of lawyer-client privilege. Disclosure to the Commission at 
the investigatory stage of such material could be prejudicial to the rights of defence of the 
undertaking under investigation. Such material could be used as the basis of proceedings by 
the Commission and would therefore adversely effect the undertaking's right of defence. 
The question of which documents the Commission can request in the course of the 
investigation is covered under Article 14(1). It extends only to documents that are deemed to 
be "necessary". However it is the Commission who determines whether any particular 
document is necessary. In AM&S10 the Court stated "... it is in principle for the Commission 
itself, and not the undertaking concerned or a third party, whether an expert or an arbitrator, 
to decide whether or not a document must be produced to it". 
In Orkem21 the Court stated that the undertaking must co-operate with the Commission and 
provide it with "all information relating to the subject matter of the investigation." 
I f the Commission required the inspection of unnecessary documents, in addition to 
breaching Article 14(1), they would also infringe the principle of proportionality that has the 
status of a general principle of Community law.22 
2 0 Case 155/79 [1982] E C R 1575 
2 1 Case 374/87 Orkem S.A. v. Commission /1989] E.C.R. 3283 
2 2 under the principle of proportionality a public authority may not impose obligations on a citizen or an 
undertaking except to the extent that they are strictly necessary in the public interest to attain the purpose of the 
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In addition to the requirement of proportionality, the Commission is further constrained by 
the requirement under Articles 14 (2) and (3) that the decision ordering the investigation 
states the subject matter and purpose of the investigation. "It must clearly indicate the 
presumed facts which it intends to investigate."23 The intention of the legislation is to prevent 
the Commission embarking on a "fishing" exercise. However the subject matter of the 
investigation and its purpose need only be stated in general terms. The identification of the 
subject matter need not be precise in relation to the document or class of documents 
requested. This practice is logical as the Commission, whilst not on a "fishing" exercise, may 
not be able to identify precisely the nature of the documents involved in the alleged breach of 
Articles 85 and 86. 
6.6 Protection of Professional Secrets after the Investigative Proceedings. 
After the investigative process is completed the Commission will issue a statement of 
objections. This procedure is designed to give the parties concerned the right to be heard as 
stipulated in Article 19. Under Article 4 of Regulation 99/6324 the Commission's decision 
can only rely on the objections raised against the undertaking "in respect of which they have 
been afforded the opportunity of making known their views". Post - investigation protection 
of professional secrets is provided for in Article 20(2) Regulation 17. The protection of 
professional secrets includes business secrets.25 However the obligation on the Commission 
not to disclose professional secrets is not absolute but is subject to Articles 19 and 21 where it 
is stated that the Commission "shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in 
the protection of their business secrets". This would appear to imply that in some 
circumstances the importance of protecting some classes of rights, for example the rights of 
defence and third party rights conflicting interests may justify an exception to the protection 
measure. It was expressly incorporated into Community law in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Case 11/70 
[1970] E C R 1125 
2 3 Case C-67/91, [1992] ECR-I 4785 at para 42 
2 4 O.J.Special Edition 1963-64 p47 the "Hearing Regulation" 
2 5 Case 53/85 AKZO Chemie BVv. Commission [1986] E C R 1965 
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of professional secrets. According to Lavoie,26 "The important issue, as the wording of 
Article 20(2) confirms, is to allow an interpretation of the obligation of professional secrecy 
which will not deprive other parties of their fundamental rights". 
In AKZO21 the issue of the special status of business secrets which form part of professional 
secrets was addressed. The case was one in which the Court was asked to rule whether a third 
party had the right to have access to documents containing business secrets. 
The Commission had issued a statement of objections to AKZO alleging infringements of 
Article 86 EC. The statement of objections was issued with a number of annexes. The same 
statement of objections was also sent to the third party complainant who subsequently 
requested the annexes in order to submit observations pursuant to Article 19.28 AKZO 
objected to the disclosure. The Commission proceeded to provide the third party with access 
to the annexes after it had deleted the passages which in its opinion contained business 
secrets. AKZO brought the proceedings under Article 173 EC before the Court to declare the 
decision ordering disclosure void. 
The Court stated in its decision that professional secrets are protected against disclosure 
under Article 20(2). This provision is to be balanced against the right of the complainant to 
be heard and also the rights of a third party with sufficient interest. However the Court went 
on to distinguish between the protection afforded to the standard professional secret, and the 
special category of business secrets. "Business secrets are afforded very special protection."29 
This protection afforded to business secrets and not the lesser professional secret is in the 
form of the procedure to be adopted by the Commission. The task of deciding whether 
documents contain business secrets remains with the Commission. However before acting on 
its decision to disclose information, it must give the supplier of the information the 
opportunity to bring an action before the Court i f it wishes to contest the decision. In AKZO 
the Commission had supplied the documents to the third party complainant before informing 
2 6 E L Rev. 1992 vol.17 p.20 
2 7 Case 53/85 
2 8 which provides that concerned parties and third parties who can show sufficient interest be heard. 
2 9 Case 53/85 at para 28 
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AKZO, thus preventing them from challenging the decision prior to the disclosure to the 
complainant. The Court therefore declared the Commission's decision void. 
The decision in AKZO therefore means that where there is a dispute between an undertaking 
and the Commission over information that the undertakings claims to be a business secret, the 
Commission must reach a formal decision on the issue that can then be challenged by the 
Court of First Instance. This must take place before any disclosure is made to third parties. 
This procedure is similar to that adopted in the case of legal professional privilege as 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
The protection afforded the business secret is complete. A complainant cannot after AKZO be 
provided with documents that the undertaking under investigation claims contains business 
secrets. The balancing of rights in Articles 19 and 21 do not apply in the case of business 
secrets. This has been reiterated by the Court in subsequent case law.30 In the recent ICI 
judgement31 the Court of First Instance decided that similar procedures to those laid down in 
AKZO should apply in cartel cases where one accused undertaking requests access to 
documents containing business secrets of another undertaking accused of participating in the 
same cartel. 
According to Joshua,32 the AKZO judgement "imposes a strict procedural and formal 
requirement irrespective of the merits of the claim for secrecy. Whether the Commission 
acted reasonably or in good faith was not considered". 
It must be noted that the concern as to the probity of the actions of the Commission is of little 
comfort to the undertaking under investigation whose business secrets have been revealed to 
a third party without it having the opportunity to challenge their disclosure as was the case 
prior to the decision in AKZO. 
Joshua points out that by affording special protection to business secrets it is acting beyond 
any express provision to be found in Regulation 17. He states that "Some less than altruistic 
3 0 see Joined Cases 142 & 156/84 BAT & Reynolds [1987] ECR 4487 at point 21. 
3 1 CaseT-36/89, ICI, judgment of the CFI of29 June 1995, not yet reported 
3 2 "Information in E E C Competition Law Proceedings" (1986) 11 E.L.Rev.409 at p. 422 
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firms may see the AKZO judgement as a golden opportunity to delay further the 
Commission's already protracted proceedings under Regulation 17".33 
Lavoie, on the other hand in response to Joshua's criticism of the AKZO decision believes that 
the total ban on disclosure of business secrets is justified to protect genuine business secrets 
even i f it means that some of the secrets are not ultimately justified. She states: "...the 
assessment by the Commission of whether a document contains business secrets or not must 
respect procedural requirements that will provide its supplier with a possibility for judicial 
review before harmful and improper disclosure is effected".34 
The prohibition against disclosure of business secrets in AKZO appears to be absolute. The 
Court was not prepared to accept that business secrets could be disclosed subject to 
conditions. Advocate General Lenz did accept a limited exception. This would occur where it 
would be impossible to determine whether or not there has been an infringement without such 
disclosure. Other than this all business secrets which the Commission wishes to disclose must 
be subject to the checking procedure described in AKZO. 
6.7 The Position of Defendant Undertakings. 
The prohibition against disclosure of business secrets laid down in AKZO extended to 
complainants. The position of the defendant undertaking was not addressed. I f the 
Commission refuses to disclose documents to the undertaking under investigation the 
undertaking would be unable to exercise their full rights of defence because some documents 
have not been made available to them. In Vitamins215 the Court stated that the rule against 
disclosure as contained in Article 20(2) must be balanced against the right to be heard as 
contained in Article 19. It did not allow the Commission 
"to use, to the detriment of the undertaking involved...facts, circumstances or documents 
which it cannot in its view disclose i f such a refusal of disclosure adversely affects that 
undertaking's opportunity to make known effectively its views on the truth or implications of 
3 3ibidatp.428 
3 4 E L Rev. 1992 vol 17p20 
3 5 [1988] O.J.L309/34 
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those circumstances on those or again on the conclusion drawn by the Commission from 
them."36 
This balancing operation between effective enforcement of the confidentiality rules and the 
right to a fair hearing poses considerable problems for the Commission. I f there are unable to 
communicate business secrets to the undertaking accused of infringing the competition rules 
due to the prohibition contained in Article 20(2), then they may be unable to proceed with 
enforcement of the competition rules as they will be unable to provide the undertaking 
concerned with the right to be heard under Article 19 as they will not have had access to the 
relevant information upon which they can respond. 
The Commission stated in its Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy37 that the 
"recognition of extensive protection of confidential information is, however, subject to an 
important exception justified by the public interest in the enforcement of the EEC 
competition rules. The confidential nature of documents does not preclude their disclosure 
where an infringement has occurred." 
In the Twentieth Competition Report38 the Commission stated its position on the access of 
defendant undertakings to the file on their case where the file contained business secrets. 
Where business secrets are contained in the file then access to that file must be restricted to 
exclude such parts of the file whose disclosure may adversely affect the supplier of the 
information. Consequently, where a file contains business secrets, the Commission may 
prepare a non-confidential summary of the file containing all the essential facts upon which 
the Commission intends to rely. Alternatively the Commission may provide only such part of 
the document that does not contain the business secret. 
3 6 ibid at para 14 
3 7 at point 43 
3 8 at point 106-107 
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6.8 The House of Lords Select Committee 
The issue of confidentiality was addressed in the House of Lords Select Committee in the 
Enforcement of Community Comnetition Rules in 1993.39 The Joint Working Party on 
Competition Law of the Bars and Law Societies of the United Kingdom ("the Joint Working 
Party") in giving evidence to the Select Committee were critical of the Commission in its 
handling of the conflict between access to the Commission's file and confidentiality. They 
found that claims of confidentiality in respect of some documents were unfounded and that 
information was no longer truly confidential by the time the Commission took action. 
"However, in any event there can be no doubt that the rights of the defence are a far superior 
right to the rights of confidentiality...and problems of confidentiality in a particular case can 
never justify the failure to provide the full rights of defence." 
The Joint Working Party went onto propose that the Hearing Officer should be given 
jurisdiction to deal with disputes over the rights of defence in the course of proceedings. They 
pointed out that this was particularly necessary as the Court of First Instance could only act 
on an appeal against a final decision of the Commission. 
The Joint Working Party identified one of the main problems in relation to the issue of 
confidentiality and access to file as the failure of the Commission to take a consistent view of 
what actually constitutes professional secrets. Mr Nicholas Forwood QC said that further 
problems were created due to the fact that lawyers and officials from different backgrounds 
within Europe had differing expectations as to what access to the file should mean. He 
criticised the Commission for failure to adequately clarify its practice resulting in significant 
variation in the level of disclosure accorded by Commission rapporteurs in different cases 
under investigation. 
Dr Ehlerman, speaking for the Commission assured the Committee that the Commission was 
committed to the rights of the defence. He believed that the Commission was "obliged to 
provide to the companies concerned documents that are manifestly exculpatory in relation to 
the allegations raised by the Commission". He admitted however that there had been errors, 
3 9 Session 1993-1994, 1st Report, 7 Dec. 1993, London, HMSO. 
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most notably in the Italian Flat Glass case40 and that procedural improvements could be 
made. He recommended that the mandate of the Hearing Officer should be enlarged so that he 
was available as a kind of ombudsman in case of difficult conflicts between access and 
protection of confidentiality. He further recommended that there should be a notice setting 
out the rules to avoid misunderstandings. 
6.9 The Revised Role of the Hearing Officer and Issues of Professional Secrecy 
In 1994 the Commission, partly in response to the findings of the Select Committee,extended 
the role of the Hearing Officer to the whole of the administrative procedure of the 
Commission.41 Under the same decision the Hearing Officer was also granted decisional 
powers. Article 5 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the decision granting these powers to the Hearing 
Officer authorises him 4 2 to decide whether certain documents in the Commission's file should 
be disclosed in order to ensure the proper exercise of the right to be heard. Article 5 
paragraphs 3 and 4 lays down the procedure that the Hearing Officer must follow when he 
intends to grant access to documents that may constitute business secrets. Before taking any 
decision, the Hearing Officer should inform the undertaking whose interests are at stake, of 
his intention and his reasons for granting access. The decision should be reasoned and specify 
the date when the disclosure is to take place. The date must not be less than one week from 
the date of the notification. During this period the undertaking concerned can lodge an appeal 
against the decision under Article 173 EC before the decision is implemented. This procedure 
corresponds to that developed by the Court in AKZO and ICI.43 
In the Twenty Third Statement on Competition the Commission confirms the procedure in 
the new terms of reference of the Hearing Officer. It states that the Hearing Officer should 
decide which items of information supplied by a firm and contained in the Commission's file 
can be communicated to other firms or published. It reiterates the established exception that 
4 0 Case T-68/89 Societa Italiano Vetro Spa and others v Commission [1992] 11 E C R 1403 
4 1 O.J. 1994 L 330/67 
4 2 To date the Commission has appointed three hearing officers all of whom have been men, reference is 
therefore made to the Hearing Officer as a man. 
4 3 although the ICI decision was delivered after the new terms of reference of the Hearing Officer. 
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publication of business secrets is necessary in cases where such secrets constitute the 
evidence upon which the Commission has to rely in order to prove an infringement. 
The new procedure is unusual in that it grants to the Hearing Officer in the area of business 
secrets the power to take a decision on behalf of the Commission that the interested 
undertaking can challenge directly before the Court of First Instance. This is not the situation 
in his other decision making powers. This can be explained by the acceptance of the Court in 
AKZO that the Commissioner in charge of competition matters may be authorised to take 
decisions ordering a surprise inspection within the meaning of Article 14(3) of Regulation 17. 
It considered that such decisions do not relate to issues of principles but were restricted to 
management issues. 
It would appear therefore that the procedures developed through the case law of the Court in 
AKZO and ICI do provide protection to the undertaking concerned about disclosure of 
business secrets. This, combined with the new terms of reference of the Hearing Officer 
provide consistency of application and essential objectivity in this field. According to Van 
der Woude:44 
"As long as the Commission combines and is compelled to combine the functions of 
prosecutor and judge, it can only look for means which soften the subjective angle of its 
unilateral powers. In this imperfect procedural context, the new terms of reference offer a 
major contribution to objectivity." 
6.10 Article 214 
To conclude this discussion of issues of confidentiality in competition proceedings it is 
necessary to briefly analyse the protection contained in Article 214 EC. This Article imposes 
upon officials of the Community institutions the obligation not to disclose any information 
that may fall into the category of professional secrets. The Stanley Adams45 case illustrates 
the scope of this protection. Adams was employed by the Swiss pharmaceutical company 
4 4 "Hearing Officers and E C Antitrust Procedures;the Art of Making Subjective Procedures more 
Objective."CMLR 33 1996 531-546. 
4 5 Case 145/83 [1985] E C R 3539 
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Hoffman-La Roche. He had approached the Commission and requested confidentiality before 
providing documents to the Commission that indicated that Hoffman-La Roche were acting 
in breach of competition law. The Commission subsequently brought proceedings against 
Hoffman-La Roche. They were found guilty and fined. The company discovered, partly as a 
result of documents supplied to them by the Commission that Adams was the informant. He 
was arrested by the Swiss police for economic espionage. His wife committed suicide and he 
suffered financial ruin. After his release he sued the Commission for damages under Article 
215. This provides that the Commission may be liable in damages for the wrongful disclosure 
of information under Article 214. The Court held that the Commission was bound by a duty 
of confidentiality and that it had violated this. In particular it found that the Commission had 
failed in its duty by not warning Adams that Hoffman-La Roche was planning to prosecute 
him. However, it held that Adams had contributed to his loss (as he returned to Switzerland 
knowing that he risked arrest) and it decided that liability should be apportioned equally 
between him and the Commission. The Commission was therefore ordered to compensate 
him to the extent of one half of the damage suffered. The actual sums involved were 
£200,000 for mental anguish and economic loss plus £176,000 costs. 
Conclusion 
The new terms of reference for the Hearing Officer in 1994 are a considerable development in 
the procedures involved in the confidentiality of information in competition proceedings. It is 
submitted that an exhaustive list of what actually constitutes a business secret is difficult in a 
system whose members each have differing rules on confidentiality. As already stated, the 
area of professional secrecy does not present well as a case for the elucidation of a general 
principle of law. This is essentially because provision is already made in the Treaty for 
protection, and further that protection cannot be absolute as the protection of confidentiality 
conflicts with the fundamental principle of the right to be heard which ultimately wil l take 
priority. The checking procedure developed in AKZO and ICI combined with the extension of 
the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer to adjudicate on questions where the confidentiality of 
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documents is being questioned presents a considerable improvement in the procedures 
enforcing competition policy. 
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Conclusion 
Chapter One of this work concludes with the suggestion that in order that human rights be 
applied uniformly throughout the member states, the Community must accede to the 
Convention. As the Court has recognised that the Community does not have competency to 
acede under the existing Treaty, amendment of the Treaty is required to facilitate accession. 
Herein lies the crucial issue for the future of the Community - and the development of the 
body of Community law. The European political climate in the 1990's is moving away from 
the promotion of greater political integration. The early ideals of a United States of Europe 
founded on monetary union and ful l political and legal citizenship appears, even to the 
Europe enthusiast, increasingly outdated in todays political and economic climate. Milward 1 
suggests that Europe post Maastricht wi l l endure a "natural dissolution" characterised by the 
"reassertion of national diversity". The reasons for this are numerous. The collapse of the 
Communist regimes of Eastern Europe has opened the possibility of wider trading links 
reducing the need for interdependence in Community member states. The political structure 
of Europe has changed. In 1989 there were 39 nation states, in 1992 that figure had risen to 
54. Rather than Europe forming a discrete and closely knit continent of established member 
states the idea of a Europe of multiple identities has become increasingly popular. 
In addition to the political climate in Europe moving away from closer integration, there 
exists hostility towards the Community and its institutions for their perceived lack of 
accountability. According to Lodge,2 in the immediate future "there must be an increase in 
the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and openness of the institutions to enhance their 
capacity to act in a coherent manner internally and externally". 
This she states is an "overriding imperative". 
Herein lies the dilemma for the Union. On the one hand the institutions and for the purposes 
of this study, the Commission, must conform to standards of greater effectiveness to inspire 
1 Milward and Soerenson "Interdependence or Integration?A National Choice" in "The Frontier of National 
Sovereignty" 1993 Routledge 
2 "Towards a political union?" in Lodge, The European Community and the Challenge of the Future. 1993, 
Pinter 
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increased confidence in the operation of the Community system in the member states. On the 
other hand, to facilitate the changes required to enhance the effectiveness of the Community, 
member states must be prepared to grant additional powers to the Community institutions. 
This has not been forthcoming. In fact any transfer of power to Community institutions 
appears to become more remote with the passage of time. The crucial factor in this is that the 
member states (in the form of the European Council) still control the Community and are 
unlikely to concede any further powers to its institutions. According to Ward 3 "The enduring 
power of the Council is the overriding reason for the present demise of the Community". 
The political wil l to change this constitutional impasse does not exist at the present time. 
Therefore the institutions of the Community are damned for failure to provide effective 
remedies (as can be seen in the case of the Court and the application of ECHR to Community 
law), yet Treaty amendment is unlikely to be approved to facilitate the provision of such 
remedies 4 As long as this situation persists, the Court wi l l be unable to develop a consistent 
and uniform application of human rights. 
This conclusion appears to indicate a general sentiment of disappointment in the application 
of general principles in the field of competition law enforcement. This is not the case. In a 
number of the areas examined in this work, solutions have been found by the development of 
general principles by the Court of Justice. Many improvements have been introduced without 
recourse to legislative amendment. This can be seen in the issue of confidentiality and the 
checking procedures introduced in AKZO.5 This is also the case for parties in competition 
proceedings being granted the right to be heard. Here the Court has developed and pursued a 
policy of granting parties the right to seek judicial review of decisions of the Commission. 
There still exists however the need to relax the strict conditions provided under Article 173 
EC. This would ensure that third parties could be confident in their ability to seek review of a 
Commission decision that effects them. This would however require Treaty amendment. 
3 "A Critical Introduction to European Law" 
4 The issue of constitutional amendment will be discussed at the forthcoming Inter Governmental Conference 
between the member states of the Union in June 1997. 
5 Case 53/85 [1986] E C R 1965 
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The issue of the plurality of the roles of the Commission in competition law enforcement is, it 
is submitted, one that can be addressed without Treaty amendment. The Court, by 
pronouncing that a penal element does exist in competition law proceedings would force a 
more onerous burden of proof onto the Commission in its decisions in this area. This would 
bring Article 6 ECHR firmly into the picture and would require the Commission to separate 
its roles in the enforcement process. Creation of an independent fact finding body would 
facilitate this development. Such a change would require amendment of Regulation 17/62, 
but not the Treaty itself. 
The issue of legal and professional privilege is one which calls for immediate reform. The 
wholly inequitable and unjustified exclusion from protection of communications between 
clients and in-house lawyers should be remedied. This is not an area that requires any 
legislative amendment. It is incumbent upon the Court, who developed the general principle 
from the body of laws of the member states, to amend this exclusion. 
The Treaty of Rome was a framework Treaty. The Court of Justice has in the last forty years 
sought to supplement that framework with a body of general principles inspired by the legal 
systems of the Community member states. In the field of competition law enforcement, the 
application of these general principles has improved the fairness of proceedings and the 
accessibility of justice. At the same time the Court has been sensitive to the need for the 
Commission to retain adequate powers to fu l f i l l its enforcement role. This can be seen in he 
investigative powers of the Commission where numerous challenges by applicants in the 
Court have been rebuffed. The Court has retained these powers as they are essential for the 
effective operation of the Commission's role. 
Improvements to the existing system are required. The Court must change its position on in-
house lawyers. It should identify the criminal law element of competition proceedings, 
forcing the Commission to fu l f i l l its fact finding role with increased rigour. Alternatively a 
separate fact-finding body should be established. This would ensure that the separation of 
powers within the enforcement process is observed. The grounds for challenging a 
Commission decision under Article 173, although generously interpreted in competition law 
proceedings should be relaxed to ensure that parties have the right to be heard by the Court. 
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The final recommendation is for the accession of the Community to the Convention. This 
would ensure uniform application of human rights law throughout the member states in areas 
of Community competence. Such a development would force a debate about the ultimate 
objectives of the Community and the status of and relationship between economic rights and 
human rights. Political realism in February 1997 suggests that such a debate is unlikely to 
take place in the immediate future. 
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